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Organizational culture is a product of both internal and external factors. Leaders sometimes
attempt to change culture using a variety of mechanisms, while the effects of external
environment simultaneously exert influence. The external environment effects can be especially
pronounced when comparing a traditional, Midwestern automotive firm (General Motors) with a
Silicon Valley automotive startup (Tesla). A study was conducted to compare the social system
of these two automakers and to identify some of the factors, both internal and external, shaping
their culture. Data was collected on the employment history of engineers and managers using the
social networking platform LinkedIn.com. Similarly, publicly-posted employee reviews were
collected from the website Glassdoor.com and analyzed using a novel method for classifying and
analyzing open-form written survey responses. Together, these records paint a picture of the
employee perceptions of culture for both companies, the breadth of external experience
represented in their workforces, and the tendency to fill management positions from internal
candidates. The results suggest that external environment has broad effects on workforce
experience, thereby creating certain cultural attributes such as loyalty or a drive to innovate. The
results also suggest that promoting internal candidates more often does not necessarily lead to

employee perception of better career opportunities. Taken together, the results reinforce but
expand traditional views of organizational culture and call for further study on the matter across
more industry groups.

DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to my wonderful family, who provided support and ideas
throughout the entire process.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my committee members Drs. Burch, Smith, Strawderman,
and Walden for the teaching, advice, counsel, and encouragement that they provided to
me along the way. I would like to thank the wonderful faculty and staff of Mississippi
State University for maintaining this seat of learning for the benefit of its students.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................................x
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1
1.1

What drives culture? ..............................................................................................3
1.1.1 Management ....................................................................................................3
1.1.2 Hiring ...............................................................................................................4
1.1.3 Learning ...........................................................................................................5
1.1.4 Mission Statements ..........................................................................................5
1.1.5 Organizational Vision ......................................................................................7
1.2
Regional Clusters...................................................................................................8
1.2.1 Notable examples of regional cultures ............................................................9
1.3
Disruptors ............................................................................................................10
1.3.1 Silicon Valley before Auto ............................................................................12
1.3.2 Traits of Disruptors........................................................................................13
1.4
Other Considerations ...........................................................................................16
1.4.1 Life Cycles.....................................................................................................16
1.4.2 Criteria of Effectiveness ................................................................................17
1.5
Data collection instruments .................................................................................18
1.5.1 Online Surveys ..............................................................................................18
1.6
Data Validity .......................................................................................................20
1.6.1 Construct Validity .........................................................................................20
1.6.1.1 Hypothesis ...............................................................................................21
1.6.1.2 Content validity .......................................................................................21
1.6.1.3 Unidimensionality ...................................................................................21
1.6.1.4 Reliability ................................................................................................21
1.6.1.5 Convergent and discriminant validity .....................................................22
1.6.2 Face validity ..................................................................................................22
1.6.3 External validity ............................................................................................23
1.6.4 Reliability and Validity Concerns for Measuring Public Attitudes...............23
1.6.5 Methods for Improvement of Results ............................................................25
II.

DIVERSITY OF PAST EXPERIENCE AMONG CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF
TESLA AND GENERAL MOTORS .............................................................................27
iv

2.1
2.2

Abstract................................................................................................................27
Introduction .........................................................................................................27
2.2.1 Sociotechnical Systems and Culture .............................................................27
2.2.2 External Environment ....................................................................................28
2.2.3 Regional Effects ............................................................................................30
2.2.4 Use of social media for data mining ..............................................................31
2.3
Methods ...............................................................................................................31
2.3.1 Data sources...................................................................................................31
2.3.2 Pilot study ......................................................................................................32
2.3.3 Selecting relevant data ...................................................................................33
2.3.4 Searching for relevant profiles ......................................................................35
2.3.5 Data recording and analysis...........................................................................37
2.3.6 Validity ..........................................................................................................38
2.3.7 Sample size ....................................................................................................39
2.3.8 Demographics ................................................................................................39
2.3.8.2 Universities attended ...............................................................................41
2.3.8.3 Employee Retention Post-College ...........................................................41
2.4
Results .................................................................................................................42
2.4.2 Employees with previous experience in other organizations ........................43
2.4.3 Mean number of previous employers ............................................................45
2.5
Discussion............................................................................................................49
2.5.1 Effects from the Great Recession ..................................................................52
2.5.2 Limitations .....................................................................................................53
2.6
Conclusions .........................................................................................................54
2.6.1 Future Work...................................................................................................55
III.

MANAGEMENT HIRING AND PROMOTION PRACTICES WITHIN TESLA AND
GENERAL MOTORS.....................................................................................................56
3.1
3.2

Abstract................................................................................................................56
Introduction .........................................................................................................56
3.2.1 Culture and the Social System .......................................................................58
3.2.2 Promotion Practices .......................................................................................59
3.3
Methods ...............................................................................................................60
3.3.1 Data sources...................................................................................................60
3.3.2 Searching for relevant profiles ......................................................................61
3.3.3 Selecting relevant data ...................................................................................63
3.3.4 Data collection and analysis ..........................................................................64
3.3.5 Secondary coding ..........................................................................................65
3.3.6 Exclusion/selection criteria ...........................................................................66
3.3.7 Determining promotion or external hiring ....................................................66
3.3.8 Validity ..........................................................................................................67
3.4
Results .................................................................................................................68
3.4.2 Managers promoted to management or hired as managers ...........................69
3.4.3 Managers’ role in previous organizations .....................................................71
3.4.4 Managers role in previous organizations when hired as managers ...............71
v

3.4.5 Managers role in previous organizations when promoted to management ...71
3.4.6 Average number of promotions .....................................................................71
3.5
Discussion............................................................................................................72
3.5.1 Differentiation ...............................................................................................73
3.5.2 Limitations .....................................................................................................74
3.6
Conclusions .........................................................................................................74
3.6.1 Future Work...................................................................................................75
IV.

EMPLOYEE PERCEPTION OF CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES WITHIN TESLA AND
GENERAL MOTORS.....................................................................................................76
4.1
4.2

Abstract................................................................................................................76
Introduction .........................................................................................................76
4.2.1 Culture ...........................................................................................................76
4.2.2 Affecting cultural change ..............................................................................77
4.2.3 Employee views on culture in the automotive industry ................................78
4.3
Methods ...............................................................................................................78
4.3.1 Glassdoor as a data source .............................................................................78
4.3.2 Data search methods on Glassdoor................................................................81
4.3.3 Data Entry ......................................................................................................83
4.3.4 Parsing Glassdoor open-form survey data .....................................................83
4.3.5 Likert scale data .............................................................................................85
4.3.6 Sample Size and Data Analysis .....................................................................85
4.4
Results .................................................................................................................85
4.4.2 Significant differences ...................................................................................87
4.4.2.1 Work/life Balance ....................................................................................87
4.4.2.2 Career Opportunities ...............................................................................88
4.4.2.3 Compensation and Benefits .....................................................................88
4.4.2.4 Senior Management .................................................................................88
4.4.2.5 Innovation ................................................................................................88
4.4.2.6 Job Satisfaction ........................................................................................89
4.4.2.7 Mission ....................................................................................................89
1.1.1 Defining attributes .........................................................................................89
4.4.3 Most important attributes ..............................................................................91
4.4.4 Compensation and Benefits factors ...............................................................92
4.5
Discussion............................................................................................................93
4.5.2 Limitations ...................................................................................................100
4.6
Conclusions .......................................................................................................101
4.6.1 Future Work.................................................................................................101
V.

CONCLUSIONS ...........................................................................................................102
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4

Promotion practices vs. perception of career opportunities ..............................102
What leads to high job satisfaction ....................................................................103
Relationship between workforce background and innovation ..........................103
Measuring culture ..............................................................................................104
vi

5.5
5.6

Relationship to existing literature ......................................................................105
Future extensions of the work ...........................................................................105

APPENDIX
A.

GLASSDOOR.COM SURVEY INSTRUMENT .........................................................119

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1

Summary of LinkedIn Digital Resume Categories ....................................................32

Table 2.2

Parameters recorded from LinkedIn ...........................................................................34

Table 2.3

Search features used on LinkedIn...............................................................................35

Table 2.4

Demographics .............................................................................................................40

Table 2.5

Top universities by number of degrees granted .........................................................41

Table 2.6

Employees remaining at their first full-time employer ..............................................42

Table 2.7

Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................................42

Table 2.8

Interaction Effect Mean Differences ..........................................................................48

Table 2.9

Top previous employers .............................................................................................49

Table 3.1

Summary of LinkedIn Digital Resume Categories. ...................................................60

Table 3.2

Search features used on LinkedIn...............................................................................61

Table 3.3

Parameters recorded from LinkedIn. ..........................................................................64

Table 3.4

Example of manager promoted from within (most recent position listed first). ........67

Table 3.5

Example of external manager hire (most recent position listed first). .......................67

Table 3.6

Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................................69

Table 4.1

Summary of studies ....................................................................................................80

Table 4.2

Summary of Questionnaire Fields from Glassdoor.com Employment Survey ..........81

Table 4.3

Data parsing categories and keywords .......................................................................84

Table 4.4

Example comments and their coding .........................................................................85

Table 4.5

Textual comment parsing statistics ............................................................................86
viii

Table 4.6

Likert response results ................................................................................................87

Table 4.7

Most-referenced Attributes .........................................................................................92

Table 4.8

Example Work/Life Balance comments .....................................................................94

Table 4.9

Example Career Opportunities comments ..................................................................95

Table 4.10 Example Compensation and Benefits comments .......................................................96
Table 4.11 Example Senior Management comments ...................................................................96
Table 4.12 Example Innovation comments ..................................................................................97
Table 4.13 Example Job Satisfaction comments ..........................................................................98
Table 4.14 Example Mission comments.......................................................................................98

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 LinkedIn search example ............................................................................................37
Figure 2.2 Prior experience among employees of GM and Tesla................................................44
Figure 2.3 Interaction effect within Company and Role on employees with previous
experience ...................................................................................................................45
Figure 2.4 Mean Number of Previous Employers .......................................................................46
Figure 2.5 Interaction effect within Company and Role on the mean number of previous
employers ...................................................................................................................47
Figure 3.1 LinkedIn search example. ...........................................................................................62
Figure 3.2 GM managers’ path to management...........................................................................70
Figure 3.3 Tesla managers’ path to management. .......................................................................70
Figure 3.4 Average number of promotions per manager. ............................................................72
Figure 4.1 Glassdoor.com review search interface ......................................................................82
Figure 4.2 Glassdoor review database .........................................................................................83
Figure 4.3 Parsed text data: responses for cultural attributes ......................................................90
Figure 4.4 Likert scale response means (* indicates significant difference) ...............................91
Figure 4.5 Compensation and Benefits detailed analysis ............................................................93

x

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For over 100 years the U.S. automotive industry consolidated the vast majority of its
management and product development into one hub: Detroit, MI [1]. As early as 1904, 42% of
all U.S.-built automobiles were produced in Michigan [2]. This is an early example of
agglomeration: geographic concentrations of interconnected organizations [3]. In fact, the
concentration of the automotive industry evolved from an even earlier Midwestern concentration
of the bicycle and coachbuilding industry, which provided laborers skilled in many of the jobs
required by the fledgling auto manufacturing trade [4].
Agglomeration in the automotive industry is largely due to the supplier/original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) model. A single supplier may serve multiple OEMs, and a
single OEM may utilize many different suppliers. While automotive manufacturing in the U.S.
has expanded beyond just the Midwest, it is heavily consolidated into a north-south corridor
bordered by Interstate 65 and Interstate 75 [2]. Beyond just the U.S., the effect has been
observed and studied in the automotive industries of Japan, Italy [5], and Thailand, which is
sometimes called the “Detroit of Asia” [6].
But despite Detroit’s unquestionable history as the capital of the U.S. automotive
industry, it is a claim built on manufacturing. Detroit’s patron saint- Henry Ford- contributed
more to the efficient production of goods than to the innovation of new products [7]. Recently,
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Detroit’s throne has been challenged by another powerful agglomeration of industry: the
technology hub of California’s Silicon Valley.
Since 2000, the momentum of U.S. automotive innovation seems to have shifted
substantially from Detroit to Silicon Valley, which has incubated and launched a number of
automotive startups. While the upstart California companies (most notably Tesla) have yet to
reach the global reach of the traditional U.S. Big Three, the startups have achieved impressive
engineering milestones as well as inspired public fascination. Much of Tesla’s success in
technology development is due to a competitive advantage in external economies of scale. There
are regional effects providing a technological advantage to Silicon Valley-based firms. The
same talent pool, universities, suppliers, and culture that feed Apple and Alphabet are also
feeding Tesla. In addition to shared resource pools, regional clustering of firms has impacts
related to the individual networking factor of employees, creating both collaboration and
competition [8].
Culture is often very different between the Detroit and Silicon Valley ecosystems,
beginning with the management. Elon Musk, tech mogul and CEO of Tesla Motors, is a
different type of leader than, for example, Mary Barra, CEO of General Motors. Musk is known
for responding directly to the media and the public using twitter, for micromanaging his firms’
(including Tesla and SpaceX, the world’s largest privately-owned space exploration firm)
operations, and for his well-known ambitions to transform Earth’s energy economy before
leaving the planet to live on Mars. Barra, whose father was a 39-year GM employee, began her
own career at GM at age of 18, was educated at GM University (now known as Kettering,) and
eventually rose through the ranks to GM’s top spot [9].
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Each of these leaders represent their firms’ essence in many ways, whether (in the case of
Musk) by painting so much of yourself on the company that the entire organization begins to
look like you or (in the case of Barra) by being such an internal product of an organization that
you yourself are its offspring.
Ultimately, one of the biggest differences between the new and old automotive industry is
the tolerance for risk and patience for profitability. In the age of Kickstarter, Silicon Valley
companies are accustomed to pushing beta-level products out the door to consumers, knowing
that enthusiastic followers will look past the bugs. The accelerated cycle of product feedback
and improvement can create first-mover effects within an industry. Startups also have the
benefit that their shareholders often prioritize growth over profitability. According to
Christensen’s hard disk industry analogy, General Motors, with its corporate mass, value-driven
shareholders and established customer base, could never be as disruptively innovative as Tesla
[10]. Conversely, if Tesla truly wants to transform itself into a mass-market vehicle producer,
Tesla may have to change its culture from ideology-driven to more value-driven such as General
Motors or other large automakers.
1.1
1.1.1

What drives culture?
Management
According to Schein, founders place an outsized role in establishing a company’s culture

[11]. Even if unintentional, founders’ assumptions and views of the world are imprinted on
nearly every decision that is made. Managers can also affect culture, primarily by embodying
certain ideals (overtly demanding culture change has been shown to be less than effective) [12]–
[14]
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1.1.2

Hiring
Another crucial driver of culture is who is hired and who is selected to fill supervisor

positions. First, it is obvious that individual characteristics and worldviews shape organizational
culture. From this perspective, culture tends to be maintained as employment candidates are
gauged by managers as to whether or not they are a good “fit” for a firm (candidates tend to selfselect as well, often sensing a culture mismatch) [15]. Iammartino et al. found that culture is
affected by the technical aptitude of managers (i.e. engineers are happier working for other
engineers) [16].
Many organizations demonstrate preference for promoting internal candidates as opposed
to recruiting external candidates. Internal promotion tendencies have the effect of incentivizing
current employees but can also create nonproductive internal competition [17], [18]. External
management candidates are more likely to bring fresh ideas, but the literature is divided on the
effect on firm innovation [19], [20].
Of the cases in which new employees are selected from an external pool, there remains
the question of which pools are being exploited. If external hires come from close competitors or
current suppliers, then they bring with them knowledge of competitors’ operations, activities and
technology. Enterprise learning through external hiring can lead to competitive advantage to the
firm who employs it [21]. Conversely, learning can also take place from knowledge spillover
from related, but different, industries; for instance, a software engineer from a smartphone
manufacturer being hired by an automotive OEM [8]. The key distinction lies in whether
applicants are considered from within the given industry, within a regional labor network, or
both. It seems likely that an automotive company located in Silicon Valley would have much
more opportunity to exploit diverse, tech-heavy regional networks, even outside of the
4

automotive industry, while a company located in Southeast Michigan would have a much larger
pool of regionally-connected applicants with automotive industry experience [22], [23].
1.1.3

Learning
External learning is the process by which organizations access, assimilate and exploit

knowledge gained from the environment. External learning typically happens through formal
partnerships, informal social knowledge sharing, and hiring of experts [21]. At least two of these
mechanisms are significantly affected by physical location: informal knowledge sharing and the
mobility of experts. The first can be envisioned as two engineers- one from Google and one
from Uber- having a drink after work and engaging in non-specific conversation about
technology or sharing industry gossip. The second involves engineers or scientists with a
valuable knowledge or experience base moving between firms and is obviously increased if
multiple attractive employment options are available without having to relocate [22]. Learning
(both external and internal) can provide competitive advantages for firms [24], [25].
Culture affects a firm’s ability to learn, but culture itself can be learned as well [26].
Levinthal found that departmentalizing organizations can facilitate the interpretation of learning
by isolating events and signals through the natural effect of buffering different operations against
each other. At the same time, tightly coupled organizations have the benefit of finer mechanisms
for detection of learning data; the customer or product is more directly connected to the
processes of manufacturing, management, sales, etc [27].
1.1.4

Mission Statements
Perhaps the most popular (and certainly easier than a Broadway production) method for

influencing culture is through the mission statement. The terminology for both mission
5

statements and organizational visions are often misused, either out of lack of understanding, or
the desire to be unique [28], [29]; fundamentally, a mission statement should capture the
existential properties of an organization. A mission statement should answer What a business is
for, and is sometimes extended to include Why, Where and How. In practice, enterprise mission
statements comply with the above guidelines to varying degrees. Notable corporate mission
statements include:
"We strive to offer our customers the lowest possible prices, the best available selection,
and the utmost convenience.”
-Amazon.com
“To grow our business by providing quality products and services at great value when
and where our customers want them, and by building positive, lasting relationships with
our customers.”
-Sears Holdings
We build cars, symbols of Italian excellence the world over, and we do so to win on both
road and track. Unique creations that fuel the Prancing Horse legend and generate a
“World of Dreams and Emotions”.
-Ferrari
“Maintaining a global viewpoint, we are dedicated to supplying products of the highest
quality, yet at a reasonable price for worldwide customer satisfaction.”
-Honda
“Create an innovation-driven, patient-focused specialty biopharmaceutical company
capable of achieving sustainable top-tier performance through outstanding execution and
a consistent stream of innovative new medicines.”
6

-AbbVie
If we compare Amazon.com to Sears Holdings, we see an emphasis on value, variety and
convenience (for Amazon) versus value, convenience and relationships (for Sears.) While the
overall messages are similar, business results would suggest that Amazon was better able to
deliver on its mission; also, Amazon’s mission of variety is clearly aligned with the realization of
the business (Amazon sells over 3 billion unique products worldwide.) Ferrari emphasizes
“excellence” and “winning”, while Honda emphasizes “quality” and “price”. It would not be
credible to suggest that Ferrari would be building economy cars, save for their mission
statement; nonetheless, it is notable that their mission statement issues a call to design products
that outperform their competitors, with no mention of sales or customers. AbbVie’s mission
statement focuses on innovation and (presumably financial) performance.
1.1.5

Organizational Vision
A vision statement makes a declaration of desired future states. If the mission statement

is now, then the vision statement is what the firm aspires to be, and is therefore (by its ambiguous
nature) influenced to a greater degree by the core ideologies of the firm [29]. Nike’s corporate
vision is “to remain the most authentic, connected, and distinctive brand,” which is notable
because the vision does not mention a product, but instead focuses on how people view the
company.
Regardless of content, it does seem that there are essentially three categories of
enterprises when it comes to both mission statements and organizational visions: Those who do
not have one, those who have one or both but do not apply them, and those who have and apply
them.
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1.2

Regional Clusters
Industries tend to collect into regional hubs, as seen in the aircraft manufacturing industry

(Seattle, WA), pharmaceutical industry (Boston, MA), banking industry (New York), and others
[30]–[32]. This effect, termed agglomeration by economists, occurs because of advantages
resulting from the geographic concentration of a value network for a particular industry [33].
The advantages are generally found to be related to shared supplier bases, advantageous
infrastructure, cross-pollination through social networks and hiring, learning via technological
spillover, and relevant labor pools fed by fitting educational programs [34]. Collectively, these
factors may be considered to be the external environment of a firm. When firms cluster, their
combined forces impacting a given environment may form common benefits.
The automotive industry in the United States is one of the best-known and frequently-studied
examples of agglomeration. Although by 1915 approximately 80% of U.S. automobile
production occurred within a 100-mile radius of Detroit [34], just 15 years earlier at the turn of
the century none of America’s 69 automotive startups were located there. What happened during
that period has been well researched and attributed to many theories, mostly relating to the
benefits of agglomeration as listed above, with one interesting exception: the influence of key
leaders, their protégés and spinoffs. Ransom Olds, founder of the Olds Motor Works, was said at
the time to have ‘‘probably trained more men of prime importance to the industry to-day than
any other pioneer” [35]. Over the following century, not much changed in regard to regional
consolidation of the automotive industry: As recently as 2008, studies found that the automobile
industry was further consolidating into a corridor beginning in Detroit and stretching south into
the southern states [2].
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Over the last decade, however, a spate of startup automotive OEMs, suppliers, and
technology developers have been founded in the Silicon Valley area. Silicon Valley’s
automotive growth roughly coincides with the rise of electronic technology in use in modern
automobiles. Presently, the Silicon Valley area is home to multiple automotive startups with at
least $1B in investment, including OEMs (Tesla, Lucid Motors, Faraday Future), autonomous
tech companies (Waymo, Cruise), suppliers (NVIDIA), mobility companies (Uber, Lyft), and
others. In fact, currently the most valuable American automaker is Tesla. This evidence is
collectively used to support the claim that the Silicon Valley area is an automotive cluster and a
legitimate challenger to Detroit’s dominance.
1.2.1

Notable examples of regional cultures
As discussed earlier, regional clusters of industries have long been identified as important

factors in enterprise development. As early as 1920, Marshall wrote about such effects in his
works defining modern economics [36]. In the aircraft production industry, airframe assembly
and sales was dominated by U.S. companies until the 1970s, when European consortiums made
inroads. Today, a U.S.-EU duopoly still exists in top-tier aircraft production, with four global
clusters of aircraft production and research: Seattle, Montreal, Toronto, and Toulouse. While
these parallel clusters might seem to provide a useful analogy to the current automotive industry,
it ultimately falls short: due to the low-volume, specialty nature of the business; there are so few
major assemblers (Boeing, Bombardier, and Airbus) that while there may be regional clusters,
each is essentially a supplier network built to support a single OEM firm [30]. In the automotive
industry, there may exist broader effects where multiple OEMs are located in the same region.
An example of densely grouped competing firms is found in the biotechnology industry,
where hundreds of firms such as Pfizer, Merrimack, Biogen, and Novartis are located in the
9

Boston, MA area. A robust network has developed around the biotechnology agglomeration,
including both public and private interests; a large number of universities and nonprofit research
organizations reinforce the private industry. It has been found that the network effect, including
both anchor firms and formal/informal relationships, create enterprise advantages for firms that
locate within the network [31].
The U.S. banking industry provides an interesting example of regional clustering, albeit
one heavily influenced by federal regulation. Prior to 1994, federal law prohibited banks from
operating across state lines, keeping America’s 10,000+ banks distributed across the country.
Once the state-line restriction was removed, however, banks quickly began consolidating, greatly
reducing the number of individual entities. While New York remains the capital of U.S. finance,
the banking sector remains relatively geographically diversified. Possible reasons for lack of
significant agglomeration include regulation (which can slow or conceal otherwise naturallyoccurring capitalistic phenomena) and the reduced advantages from shared supplier networks as
opposed to manufacturing industries [32].
1.3

Disruptors

The use of “disruptors” in the public lexicon is fairly new. The term “disruptive innovation” was
first coined by Christensen in 1995 [37]; more recently, Google searches for the word
“disruptor” increased tenfold from August 2017 to August of 2018 alone. While the word may
be new, the phenomenon is not. The Fortune 500 rankings turned over more than 2.5 times from
1962-2012 as 1,332 companies entered or left. [38]. Some stark examples of disruptive
innovation in recent years include streaming entertainment services disrupting traditional
broadcast media, wireless communication disrupting wired communication, and the app-served
independent contractor model (Uber) for on-demand transport disrupting traditional taxicabs.
10

The Sharing Economy, sometimes also called the gig economy, has come to represent a large
class of new service businesses focused on using technology and independent contractors to
provide services of convenience. While not all sharing businesses technically require sharing
services or equipment, the terminology originated in the concept of increasing the usage factor of
equipment such as vehicles. Example industries include hospitality (Airbnb), mobility (Uber),
logistics (PostMates)[39], pet sitting (DogVacay), car rental (Turo), personal loans (Lending
Club), and WiFi network sharing (Fon) [39]–[45]. The two biggest names in the sharing
economy are Airbnb and Uber [46]. Uber’s success is often tracked by using its New York City
business as a measure. Uber launched in New York in 2011, with a significant ramp-up of
activities beginning in 2014 [47]. By 2017, ride-hailing companies were providing more rides
every month than taxis [48]. Direct employment effects have included lower wages for taxi
drivers and a reduction in employee bargaining power [49], [50].
Uber has been investing heavily in autonomous vehicle technology. It has been said that Uber
cannot be profitable until it stops paying drivers (although other smaller ridesharing firms have
reportedly found profitability by minimizing investment costs) [51]. By using fleets of selfdriving, electric vehicles, Uber can maximize the lifetime and utilization rates of its resources.
Proponents of the vehicle-sharing vision suggest that the model of personal vehicle ownership
will be replaced by mobility-as-a-service (MaaS), where vehicles are owned and operated by
large fleets [52]. A popular opinion among forward-looking academic researchers is that
electrification, autonomy, and ride sharing together will bring about this transformation [53].
Arbib and Seba do not mince words:
By 2030, within 10 years of regulatory approval of autonomous vehicles (AVs),
95% of U.S. passenger miles traveled will be served by on-demand autonomous
11

electric vehicles owned by fleets, not individuals, in a new business model we call
“transportation-as-a-service” (TaaS) [54].
The ultimate vision is that a fewer number of vehicles can serve a greater number of people. In
fact, there is evidence to suggest that “peak car” (as measured by global annual miles driven)
happened about a decade ago, and that automobile transport continues on a steady decline [55].
In the U.S., per-person car ownership peaked in 2006, has obvious effects for the companies who
make cars. Both Ford and General Motors have recently announced significant layoffs, and
automotive news magazines constantly refer to an expected automotive downturn. Some project
a 90% reduction in new car sales by 2050.
However, it is possible that the current downturn in automotive sales is tied mostly to a complex
set of cultural factors. For instance, when everyone has the world at their fingertips via highspeed internet at their home, why do you ever need to leave? Additionally, MaaS is not a new
concept. The idea was known in 2009 as Flexible Transport Services (FTS), in 2000 as DemandResponsive Transport (DRT), and in 1991 as Mobility Management [56], [57]. Further, the
backbone of MaaS theory is not autonomous vehicles and ridesharing, but efficient mass public
transport- options which have existed for decades.
The U.S. automotive industry has suffered over the years from a number of diseases: poor
manufacturing practices, discontinuous regulatory environment, shareholder pressures, and
organized labor, to name a few. Automotive startups have an advantage in key areas (as
discussed in 3.2) and will continue to be a disruptive force to Ford and GM.
1.3.1

Silicon Valley before Auto
It is important to note that the unprecedented concentration of high-tech industry in

Silicon Valley did not occur explicitly by accident. When Hewlett-Packard was formed as a
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spinoff from Stanford University in 1937, Marshall’s works describing the benefits of regional
clustering were still fresh, popular new ideas of which the faculty at Stanford were almost
certainly aware. Over the following decades as dozens of other high-tech startups were
supported by Stanford as well as Cal Berkley and others, certain visionaries likely recognized the
potential for mutual advantage through regional agglomeration and even helped to engineer such
a system. Unlike other regions with pre-existing affinities toward certain industries, this
particular region of California started as a sort of “clean slate”, making Silicon Valley more
receptive to progressive ideas toward economics and entrepreneurship [58].
Today we have a unique opportunity: to examine two agglomerations, within the same
industry, within the same country, but born in different millennia and of different legacies. This
study will look at how much the native cultures of the Silicon Valley and Detroit automotive
ecosystems influence the cultures of automotive firms headquartered there.
1.3.2

Traits of Disruptors

As discussed in Section 1.3, industry disruptors are not new. One can imagine the downturn in
the scribe industry in the fifteenth century as the Gutenberg printing press spread around the
world. Are there certain traits among organizations or individuals that lead to disruptive
innovation? Are disruptive companies flatter, or more agile, or just lucky? Are their leaders
more visionary, more inspiring, or also just lucky?
One important trait is proactiveness, or a firm’s willingness to respond to market opportunities,
acting first on anticipated needs. Proactiveness has been shown to be positively correlated with
performance for companies in embryonic and growth stages, but not for mature firms, where
chasing every opportunity can become a distraction and waste resources. Competitive
aggressiveness is ability and willingness to respond decisively to industry threats. Competitive
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aggressiveness is associated with improved performance for mature firms, but not for startup
firms [59].
Quinn and Cameron found that firms should be judged by different criteria of effectiveness
depending on where they are in the industry life cycle [60]. Roussel et al. describe four phases
of maturity: embryonic, growth, mature, and aging [61]. The most valuable traits during the
embryonic and growth phases are flexibility, resource acquisition, cohesiveness/morale, and
development of human resources. For firms entering the formalization stage, the most valuable
traits undergo a “dramatic” shift to stability, control, efficiency, goal-setting, productivity, and
the like. Interestingly, organizations in the most mature phase (elaboration of structure) should
also be measured significantly by similar metrics as new organizations, as decentralization of
control encourages entrepreneurial efforts within nearly-independent units [60].
The pattern of industrial innovation can largely be said to alternate between periods of product
innovation and periods of process innovation. The tungsten filament light bulb was clearly a
radically innovative product when it was invented; for the next 50 years, however, the light bulb
sustained a steady stream of evolutionary, process innovation, improving both its performance
and cost. It is often from small organizations which come the product innovations and from
established firms the process innovations [62].
However, while there are traits that are found to be beneficial for disruptors (or at least present in
the successful ones,) there is a body of evidence that in many cases the essential element for
industrial disruption is found in the disrupted. As stated by Christensen, the crux of the problem
is this:
Using the rational, analytical investment processes that most well-managed
companies have developed, it is nearly impossible to build a cogent case for
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diverting resources from known customer needs in established markets to markets
and customers that seem insignificant or do not yet exist. [37]
Disruptive products provide features or performance for which the customer has not yet asked.
As Henry Ford supposedly said, “If I had asked people what they wanted, they would have said
faster horses.” Many of Silicon Valley’s automotive innovations fall into this category. For
instance, over-the-air (OTA) software updates pioneered by Tesla in 2012 allow a constant
refresh of vehicle features, adding self-driving functionality or improving acceleration with an
overnight software push. GM and Ford have announced plans to follow suit, but their first OTAequipped vehicles won’t appear until 2020 and will have limited functionality. No customers
were asking for OTA in 2012 because they couldn’t yet conceive of the idea of vehicle hardware
performance being upgraded via a (1) wireless (2) software update (3) from home. Because
there was no customer demand, established automakers likely never seriously considered making
the investment.
Tesla’s shareholders have invested for future earnings potential and are therefore relatively
patient with regard to short-term profitability. Ford and General Motors’ shareholders have
invested in those firms because they value consistent annual dividends. To avoid losing market
share, Ford and GM will need to do the one thing that’s possibly the most difficult for them: tell
shareholders not to expect dividends for a couple of years while they invest in R&D. On the
other hand, Tesla shareholders do eventually expect to earn profits and dividends. As long as the
company remains public, Tesla will eventually have to transition to maintaining its market
position, possibly losing sight of disruptive opportunities in the process.
It seems, therefore, that it is in fact the traits of the mature firms that leave them open to
disruption. The disadvantage of startups (lesser resources and no established customer base to
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draw from) is exactly the same thing that enables them to pursue disruptive innovations that
mature firms do not pursue.
1.4
1.4.1

Other Considerations
Life Cycles
Most organizations can be shown to experience predictable changes as they form and

mature. Abernathy’s seminal work outlined three evolutionary periods for new firms: an initial
period of flexibility, where product innovation is high; a period of transition, where product
variety and volume are emphasized through process innovation; and a period of maturity, where
cost reduction, incremental improvement and profitability are key [62]. Within Abernathy’s
theory, implications on technical management were suggested. One such theory was that fluidity
in management and organizational structure in the early stages is a product of uncertainty about
both requirements and market. Abernathy also suggests that, later, increased standardization
reduces the need for communication and thus breeds departmentalization and thus increased
levels of authority. In a later work specifically focused on the automotive industry, Abernathy
[7] proposes four categories of innovation: architectural, revolutionary, regular, and niche.
These four categories, arranged as a quad chart, represent innovative advancements across the
scales of technology and market. For instance Ford’s Model T, released in 1908, was both new
technology (in terms of both product and process) and produced for a new market; the Model T
was therefore categorized as an architectural innovation, because it established the framework
for all similar products which followed. Revolutionary innovations bring new technology to an
existing market, regular innovations are incremental advancements in existing technology and
markets, and niche innovations are adapting existing technologies to new markets [7].
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Not all organizations are formed as startups, however. De Alio (“from another”) firms
are spinoffs from firms in another industry. Carrol et al. [4] studied all new entrants to the U.S.
automotive industry from 1885-1981, including De Alio as well as De Nuvo (“from anew,” or
startup) firms. Carroll found that De Nuvo startup firms had higher initial mortality rates than
De Alio firms, but certain De Nuvo firms (specifically, those with preproduction periods
indicating a measure of strategic planning) had lower mortality rates after 12 years of existence.
The initial advantage of De Alio firms was attributed to their greater access to resources, while
the later advantage of De Nuvo firms was attributed to their agility and likelihood of being built
specifically for the industry they were entering.
Similar results can be observed in other economies. Cantner et. al. performed a related
study on the German automotive industry, studying all German automakers entering the market
between 1886 and 1936. The variables analyzed included pre-entry knowledge or experience,
post-entry knowledge or experience, and innovative knowledge or experience. It was found that
firms with little or no pre-entry experience, but who exhibited high innovation, were more likely
to succeed than firms with pre-entry experience who did not innovate (as measured through
patents granted) [63]. The findings indicate that innovation can overcome lack of experience for
startup firms. While different researchers may divide or name the life cycle stages differently, a
general finding is that most firm failures occur during the transitions between stages.
1.4.2

Criteria of Effectiveness
Startups and established firms will almost certainly not be comparable in profitability,

revenue, market share, or other metrics typically used to define corporate success. Comparisons
must instead be based on relative criteria of effectiveness depending on current progression
within their life cycle. Organizations in the entrepreneurial phase should be measured by their
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flexibility and effectiveness at growing resources. Later, in the collectivity, formalization and
control, and finally elaboration of structure phases, the most relevant measures of effectiveness
shift to human relations, internal process, and rational goals, respectively. Interestingly,
organizations in the most mature phase (elaboration of structure) should also be measured
significantly by similar metrics as new organizations, as decentralization of control encourages
entrepreneurial efforts within nearly-independent units [60].
1.5
1.5.1

Data collection instruments
Online Surveys

Questionnaires are one of the oldest instruments for social research data. As a method for
gathering information from a population using standardized questions, questionnaires are
distinguished from interviews by the lack of direct interaction with the researcher(s) [64]–[66].
In general, response rates for all forms of surveys have decreased in recent years. Falling
response rates may be a result of the proliferation of research studies, especially on college
campuses. Students are said to be becoming more desensitized to survey requests [67].
There are many different mechanisms for distributing surveys: by telephone, face-to-face,
offline, or online. The type of mechanism likely has an effect on the results. For instance, if the
question has an associated social expectation (i.e. “How do you feel about life at the present
time?”) respondents tend to give more positive responses for telephone surveys and more
negative responses for online surveys [68], [69]. Kreuter et al. found that online responses were
more truthful and more accurate, indicating that telephone interviews lead to social desirability
effects [70].
Online surveys have both advantages and drawbacks as compared to other forms. Online
surveys provide a broad reach and the opportunity to solicit responses from large, socially
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diverse populations. Online surveys can also be developed and distributed quickly. They can
include interactive features such as required responses or question trees. Finally, online surveys
can simplify the data entry and coding problem by already having the data in digital form. On
the other hand, online surveys can miss lower-class, elderly, and other social demographics who
do not regularly use the internet. They can also suffer from technical or user errors [71]. A
major potential pitfall of online surveys is the increase in web access from mobile devices; no
one is going to type out a lengthy open-form survey response on a smartphone (although
“mobile-only” users can sometimes capture a missing demographic) [72]–[74].
It may be especially important then for online surveys to carefully select the form of the
questionnaire. A particularly attractive method for online surveys is the Likert scale. First
proposed by Rensis Likert in 1932, Likert scales invite respondents to answer a question by
providing a relative response from a closed list of options [75]. A variety of works have been
published examining the appropriate number of questions and response categories [76]. It has
even been found that the spatial orientation in which the Likert categories are presented is
significant. Vertical lists work better for absolute questions, while horizontal lists work better
for relative judgement questions [77].
Recently, gamification has been studied as a potential method to make completing surveys more
enjoyable. If the task is more enjoyable, then the response rate should be increased. The risk
would be that gamification techniques could have bias effects on the results. Multiple studies
have shown that while gamification does provide an overall better survey experience, and though
there is no indication of bias from the method, the response and engagement rates are not
improved [78], [79].
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Surveys can be valuable tools when administered to gauge employee satisfaction; employees
perform better when they feel that they are capable of affecting change. On the other hand, often
the surveys are treated as rituals and no resulting change is enacted, in which case the survey is
actually a dissatisfier for employees [80].
1.6
1.6.1

Data Validity
Construct Validity

The concept of construct validity, first developed by Cook, Campbell and Schwab [81], [82], has
been defined variously as:
“whether operational variables adequately represent theoretical constructs” [83]
“representing the correspondence between a construct (conceptual definition of a
variable) and the operational procedure to measure or manipulate that construct” [82]
“The extent to which an operationalization measures the concept it is supposed to
measure” [84]
“Whether or not the operational variables used to observe covariation can be interpreted
in terms of theoretical constructs” [85]
Testing construct validity can be done using a three-step process [86]:
1. Content validity: identify measures which are thought to test the hypothesis
2. Construct validity: empirically assess the success of the chosen measures in
unidimensionality, reliability, validity
3. Nomological validity: determine the predictability of a construct’s relation to
other constructs
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1.6.1.1

Hypothesis

Hiring and promotion practices influence the elements of organizational culture, including
loyalty, competitiveness, and innovation.
1.6.1.2

Content validity

Measure 1: Previous role (internal vs. external) of current managers within an organization
Measure 2: Cultural attributes as determined by employee surveys
1.6.1.3

Unidimensionality

One could apply exploratory factor analysis to the proposed measures [87]. According to the
literature, empirical indicators should only be significantly influenced by the latent variable
being studied, where an influence of confounding variables is considered to be significant at
factor loadings over 30% [86]. The challenge with using an existing data set is that if the
specific measures are not tested in the instrument, then measures must be inferred from other
data. For instance, if the Glassdoor survey asks “Rate the career opportunities at your current
employer,” then that is a different question than “Do you think your current employer rewards
loyalty?”.
1.6.1.4

Reliability

Reliability is the consistency of results taken within a given period of time. Reliability may be
assessed by a number of methods, including test-retest, alternative forms, Cronbach’s α, or the
Werts, Linn, and Jöreskog (WLJ) composite reliability method [86]. The first two of these
reliability assessment methods (test-retest and alternative forms) require data points from two
separate points in time (t and t+1). The two data sources used in this study, LinkedIn.com and
Glassdoor.com, are static and therefore incompatible with test-retest. The last two methods
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(Cronbach’s α and WLJ) require multiple indicators for a measure. Multiple indicators may be
possible to achieve with the pre-existing data set from the Glassdoor survey by attempting to
correlate numerical Likert responses with open-form textual responses. There is no known way
to assess reliability of online digital resumes from LinkedIn.
1.6.1.5

Convergent and discriminant validity

Convergent validity for the online survey may be tested using the same methods required for the
WLJ reliability measures; that is, do the data from the numerical Likert responses and the openform textual responses converge? There is no known way to directly measure convergent
validity for online resumes; however, some studies have examined completeness [88] as well as
deception [89] in online resumes; completeness (meaning that all profile sections are populated)
could provide some indication of validity for online resumes.
It is difficult to determine discriminant validity using either the multitrait-multimethod matrix
method (MTMM) or the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) method for existing data sets due to
the difficulty in proving unidimensionality.
1.6.2

Face validity

Face validity “refers to the degree to which a test respondent views the context of a test as
relevant for the situation being considered” [90], [91]. In the case of data taken from LinkedIn,
such naturalistic data taken through “unobtrusive measures” [92] is free from relevance to face
validity. Respondents are simply populating an online profile, with most unaware that each entry
is a data point in a giant global social science dataset known as the internet.
In the case of Glassdoor, no studies were found measuring the face validity of the specific
Glassdoor survey instrument.
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1.6.3

External validity

A straightforward definition of external validity is to ask the question “to whom do the results of
this trial apply?” [93]. Some studies have suggested that research done using online datasets are
often presented as externally valid to more groups than they truly are [94]. Others have claimed
that the external validity of studies based on online data sets is no different than any other
research method [95].
In the case of the proposed study, it is generally expected that the results are valid (beyond the
study group) to other industries experiencing a disruption cycle. In addition, some generalizable
conclusions may be drawn about the nature of culture in organizations.
1.6.4

Reliability and Validity Concerns for Measuring Public Attitudes

“Attitudes are latent variables. Although they influence behavior, attitudes cannot be directly
observed; they must be inferred through a person’s various actions or pronouncements.”
[96]
A study could be formed to examine public attitudes toward a specific advanced technology
(such as robotics), emerging technologies, or the field of science in general [97]–[99]. Such a
study could be administered through a social networking service. In this scenario, careful
attention must be paid to the design of such a study so as to:
•

Ensure construct validity

•

Maximize external validity

•

Maximize reliability

•

Minimize response bias

•

Minimize nonresponse bias
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For the proposed study to have good construct validity, it must be shown that the methods and
results of the study provide appropriate data toward judging the hypothesis [84]. If the survey
instrument is composed primarily of Likert-scale questions, then careful attention must be given
to (1) constructing the wording of the questions, (2) formatting the response options, and (3)
providing question redundancy to reinforce the topic. If the research hypothesis is “LinkedIn
users under the age of 30 have higher trust in artificial intelligence than older users,” then
appropriate steps must be completed (both in pre-test and post-test stages) in order to validate the
construct validity.
The external validity refers to the applicability of the study findings to demographics outside of
the sample population. In this case, the sample population is a professional social networking
site. Users of the site are much more likely to be highly educated than the general public [100].
Therefore, it would be difficult to statistically show that the study has validity to the general
public. The difficulties are compounded by the fact that the study is examining attitudes toward
technology, by using technology to administer the study. There may be a disconnect between the
experimentally accessible population and the target population [101].
Reliability of the survey instrument can be a concern if respondents are “satisficing” the
responses, or providing answers without considering the questions [67]. An example of
satisficing could “straight-lining”, or proving the same answer for every question on the
questionnaire. Reliability can also be impacted by the content of the study. For questionnaires
addressing population attitudes, questions of a more ideological nature were found to be more
reliable that questions addressing specific policy issues [102].
Response bias of the study can be a concern if the questionnaire methods influence respondents’
answers to a question. Since the proposed study is about attitudes, which cannot be directly
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measured, the study will have to be carefully constructed to infer attitudes from responses to
closed-form questions.
Nonresponse bias, on the other hand, occurs when respondent demographics are shifted and not
representative of the sample population. This can be shown to be the case when the
demographics of those who respond to the survey are different than those who do not respond to
the survey. An example is found in the work of Sax, in whose study women responded at a
much higher rate than men [67].
1.6.5

Methods for Improvement of Results

The first method for improving results is to examine the literature and find successful techniques
that have been employed elsewhere. For instance, Zhang and Defoe studied AI attitudes in
America by distributing an online survey [103], McMillan et al. measures the effects of
demographics on attitudes toward environmentalism [104], and Bartneck et al. examined public
attitudes toward robots [97], [105]. Each of these studies has strong points as well as areas of
weakness.
Another method for improving the results could be to broaden the respondent pool by including
other distribution methods (such as email, telephone and even snail mail). By soliciting
responses via other distribution channels, the diversity of the sample population could be
improved. Online respondents are likely to be more technologically advanced than mail
respondents. Kwak and Radler found that web respondents are more likely to be “younger, male,
[…] with greater technological sophistication” [106]. Such a pool of respondents would likely
skew the results of a study on attitudes toward advanced technology. If mixed-mode survey
methods are employed, however, care must be taken to avoid mode bias [67].
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Strong Likert scale questions are as short as possible, do not use double negatives, are not
leading, and contain only one question. It may be beneficial to place an easy question first on the
questionnaire in order to draw in respondents. Questions about demographic information such as
age and gender are normally placed last. In order to improve reliability, important questions can
be repeated in a multiple ways [64]. Having more Likert response categories may improve
reliability (Alwin and Krosnick recommend seven) [102].
By understanding the tendencies of survey types early on, a study can be adjusted in order to
improve validity and reliability of the results. Study optimization may include varying
distribution channels in order to reach more diverse respondents, crafting the body of the
questionnaire carefully, and presenting the results along with the appropriate external validity.
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CHAPTER II
DIVERSITY OF PAST EXPERIENCE AMONG CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF TESLA AND
GENERAL MOTORS
2.1

Abstract
General Motors and Tesla are U.S.-based automotive manufacturers, but culturally and

organizationally they are very different. They each recruit from specific groups of universities,
hire from certain labor pools, and operate within certain external environments. The result is that
their human systems are composed of employee groups with company-specific and different
backgrounds. Social media data was used to compile the previous employment experience of
500 engineering employees of General Motors and Tesla. Statistical analysis indicated several
significant differences, including the average number of previous employers and the number of
employees with experience in other organizations. Differences were also observed between the
most frequent previous employers. The differences in employee backgrounds is expected to
have a broad effect on the overall sociotechnical system for both companies and provide insight
into the impact of regional external environments on organizational culture.
2.2
2.2.1

Introduction
Sociotechnical Systems and Culture
An organization’s culture is a crucially important attribute to organizational performance.

Left to create an optimally designed culture, any organization can have a strong chance for
success. Yet organizations do not exist in a vacuum, and their cultures are influenced by factors
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outside of their direct control. Pasmore says in relation to sociotechnical systems (STS) design,
“Thus, the culture of an organization tends to become aligned with the influence of important
constituencies outside the organization” [107].
It may be intuitively expected that the culture of a Silicon Valley-based automotive
startup and a hundred-year-old Detroit firm would be different, but why is that so? Both operate
in a global market, under the same Federal regulations, and produce competing products. There
must be elements of their environment, therefore, that are different and have shaped a particular
culture. As it turns out, there are significant differences, and they are found in the people
(businesses are, after all, collections of people.) Factors such as affinity for or against organized
labor, the quality and specialty of local universities, and state laws affecting the movement of
employees between competing firms are regional factors which could be expected to have a
significant impact on the labor makeup of a firm.
2.2.2

External Environment
Pasmore describes an organization’s environment as “the totality of systems surrounding

and influencing a focal organization,” and lists such examples as “systems of government,
systems of nations, ecological systems, transportation systems, systems of cultural beliefs,
systems of trade, monetary systems, and the solar system” [107]. Such a broad scope of study
represents a maturation of Bertalanffy’s original general system theory (GST) into modern
systems thinking of organizations as open systems [108]. Negandhi lists the factors of the
external environment as socioeconomic, educational, political, cultural, and legal [109], [110].
Porter describes “Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy” which includes a portion of the
external environment, but some environmental factors are not strictly competitive (for instance
local incentives or shared resources) [111].
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It is important to consider what specifically are the environmental variables for the firms in the
scope of this study. Based on a survey of available literature, the following factors were found to
be broadly significant across the automotive industry [12], [13], [26], [112], [113]:
•

Labor factors
o Unions
o Education/training system
o Pool of experienced workforce
o Non-compete laws

•

Resource factors
o Supply chain
o Infrastructure (shipping, power, etc.)

•

Regulatory factors
o Incentives
o Taxes

•

Market factors

Labor factors are related to the likelihood of employees to move for new career opportunities.
Willingness to move to a new city for a job tends to be predominantly an American trait [114].
Worker openness to relocation has been shown to be related to individual personality
characteristics [115], [116], but is hard to associate with specific demographic parameters other
than age [117], [118]. The likelihood of human migration from place to place is shown to
decrease as a power law (exponent -1) of the distance [119]. As a very limited example of
distance affecting population migration, according to the US Census Bureau between the years
2013 and 2017 only 186 people moved between Wayne County, MI (where General Motors is
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headquartered) and Santa Clara County, CA (where Tesla is headquartered), while 12,205 people
moved between Wayne County and Washtenaw County, MI (home of Ann Arbor) [120]. This
study infers that employees are willing to be more mobile to other jobs within the same
geographic region, which reinforces the significance of the external environment in shaping
workforce.
2.2.3

Regional Effects
Many of the factors influencing external environment are regional; this is especially true

for labor factors. The automotive industry in the U.S. has been traditionally been centered
around Detroit, Michigan (known as the “Motor City.”) By 1915, 80% of America’s automotive
manufacturing was based in the Detroit area, with names such as Ransom Olds, Henry Ford, and
the Dodge brothers competing to commercialize automobiles. A half-century later, a similar
transformation began in California’s Silicon Valley as leaders such as David Packard, William
Hewlett, William Shockley, and Steve Jobs led commercialization of electronics and computer
technology [58]. Current automobiles have become software-heavy products, with the rise in
infotainment, connectivity, automation, and powertrain electrification. The base skills found in
Silicon Valley’s computer and electronics industries, therefore, are quite well suited to many of
the requirements of modern automotive design; when also factoring in Silicon Valley’s
entrepreneurial spirit, it should be no surprise that a number of California-based startup firms are
aiming to disrupt the automotive industry.
General Motors and Tesla are the biggest automotive companies based in Detroit and
California, respectively. The research question posed within this study examines the
employment history of the engineers (both managers and non-managers) who work at General
Motors and Tesla to understand how the workforce of each company is influenced by its external
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environment. What is the typical resume of a current engineering employee at GM or Tesla?
This question can be explored using data from another technology popularized in Silicon Valley:
the social network.
2.2.4

Use of social media for data mining
Social networking platforms have become valuable sources of data for both researchers

and marketers alike [121]. Zide et al. studied users’ tendencies to include different information
on their LinkedIn profiles based on occupation, as well as determined the most important
information categories to recruiters [88]. In another study, Utz found that the information
provided to users by the LinkedIn platform actually helped users’ careers [122]. Social networks
can also be used to map collaborative relationships between researchers [123]. Websites such as
Glassdoor.com have been mined to build a picture of general employee satisfaction [124]–[127].
LinkedIn itself has even published about the ways it mines its own data set [128]. LinkedIn is
recognized as a data-rich target for researchers to employ [129]. Using social media data
mining, the professional networking website LinkedIn.com is utilized to compare the workforces
of General Motors and Tesla.
2.3
2.3.1

Methods
Data sources

For this study, the website LinkedIn.com was used to collect data on current and previous
employment history. LinkedIn.com is a professional social networking site which is used for
recruiting and job hunting, personal marketing, business marketing, and networking [130].
LinkedIn profiles are digital resumes. Users may fill in up to 18 categories of data, as listed in
Error! Reference source not found..
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Summary of LinkedIn Digital Resume Categories

Accomplishments

Background

Table 2.1

2.3.2

Profile category
Name
Region
Industry
Intro
About
Skills
Background: work experience
Background: education
Background: licenses and certifications
Background: volunteer experience
Accomplishments: publications
Accomplishments: patents
Accomplishments: courses
Accomplishments: projects
Accomplishments: honors and awards
Accomplishments: test scores
Accomplishments: languages
Accomplishments: organizations

Pilot study
An initial pilot study was performed by collecting 50 records each from General Motors

and Tesla. During the pilot study, most of the available data categories were collected and
recorded. Such a broad data collection strategy was to help determine which data categories are
most relevant and most useful for an analysis to answer the research question. The pilot study
also served as a learning tool for understanding the search feature of the website and informed
changes in searching and sampling methods which were implemented in the final data collection.
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2.3.3

Selecting relevant data

The categories selected to record for this study are shown in Error! Reference source not
found. and include categories used as data validity indicators and categories used to answer the
primary research question. Since profile data can be modified by the profile owner at any time,
the date that the profile was captured is recorded. Information used for data validity estimation
includes the number of connections as well as the population of optional profile fields (skills,
accomplishments, interests, and picture). The number of mutual connections as well as the
degree of connection between the profile being viewed and the active profile that the data is
collected under are used to identify any bias in search results from existing connections.
The remaining fields are used to answer the research question. In the pilot study, many
of the fields had multiple entries (i.e. a list of 4 previous employers or 8 previous job titles.)
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Table 2.2

Parameters recorded from LinkedIn

Data column

Description

Entry #
Date retrieved
Gender
Degree of
Connection
Connections

Unique number for each profile.
Date that the data was retrieved
Gender of the profile, if available
Degree of connection to the profile. 1 = connection, 2 =
connection of connection, etc.
Number of connections of the respondent
Number of followers of the respondent. This is only available
if the respondent produces content (posts, shares, etc.)
Number of mutual connections between me and the
respondent
List of every current and past employer (final study included
since 2010 only)

Followers
Mutual
connections
Employer
First Full-time
Employer

The first full-time employer, along with year
Number and list of all previous organizations since Jan 1,
Previous orgs
2010
Title
List of every current and past job title
Stratified Title
Manually stratified job titles
Location
Location of job titles (if available.)
Start date
Start date for each job title
End date
End date for each job title. "Present" if current title.
Education
University and degree conferred for each engineering
degree.
Education
Physical main campus of each university listed under
Location
"Education." Determined by Google search.
Whether or not the respondent has populated the "skills"
Skills
section of the profile with any data.
Whether or not the respondent has populated the
Accomplishments "accomplishments" section of the profile with any data.
Whether or not the respondent has populated the "interests"
Interests
section of the profile with any data.
Picture
Whether or not the respondent has uploaded a picture
Profile
Completion
Calculated metric estimating the profile completion
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Pilot Final
study study
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

2.3.4

Searching for relevant profiles
Control variables for the study include current employer and role. Profiles were

identified for current employees of General Motors and Tesla. The study was limited to
technical or management employees, so staff such as recruiters or accountants were excluded.
The LinkedIn search feature was used to find profiles matching the above criteria. The search
was performed by using multiple filters in the search feature. Error! Reference source not
found. shows the filters that were applied for the search.
Table 2.3

Search features used on LinkedIn

Parameter
Keyword
Current companies
Type
Title

Term
“engineer”
“General Motors” or “Tesla”
People
"manager OR director OR president OR chief OR VP" or null

A total of four searches were performed. The first search was for engineering (or
technical) managers at General Motors. The results were filtered to only include those with a
current job title (“Title”) including one of the words shown in Error! Reference source not
found.. The keyword “engineer” was used in the general search box to limit results to those
having some engineering reference or background. Next, the search was repeated, but without
the title filters (while still maintaining the “engineer” keyword.) Finally, these two searches
were repeated but with Tesla as the current company. Each search results in 100 pages of
results, with 10 results per page.
The “current company” filter box automatically searches for companies with LinkedIn
pages, reducing the likelihood that profiles are unintentionally excluded due to differences in
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human data entry (i.e. employees listing their current employer as GM instead of General
Motors.) An example of this search method is shown in Error! Reference source not found..
The exact parameters of the LinkedIn search feature are unknown, so entries were
selected randomly in order to reduce the effect of LinkedIn’s search ranking algorithms. A
random number generator was used to generate 13 numbers between 1 and 100 (corresponding to
the 100 pages of search results). For each random number, all 10 profiles were recorded from
the corresponding page of search results. For the last random number, only the first five profiles
were recorded. This process was performed separately, with different sets of random numbers,
for General Motors and Tesla.
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Figure 2.1

2.3.5

LinkedIn search example

Data recording and analysis
Data was recorded using Google Sheets. Data was hand-coded into the sheet and

analyzed using pivot tables, filters, and formulas.
The study includes analysis of one independent variable and one dependent variable at a
time. The two groups being compared (current employees of GM and Tesla) are independent.
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An α value of 0.05 is used as a minimum threshold for assessing statistical significance [131].
The data was exported from Google Sheets to IBM SPSS Statistics 26 for statistical analysis.
2.3.6

Validity
Estimating the validity of the data on LinkedIn profiles is difficult because only the user

knows the accuracy and completeness of the data; however, some information as to the validity
of the data can be inferred by the effort that the user has put into creating the profile. It is
possible for users to incompletely populate mandatory fields such as work history. An example
of incomplete entry would be only listing their most recent job. It is reasonable to suppose, as an
estimate, that users who invest the additional effort to complete the optional fields of their
LinkedIn profiles are likely to have also entered their complete work history.
LinkedIn profiles also report how many “connections” the user has. Users with a high
number of connections are more likely to be invested users of the site and may be more likely
have to up-to-date profiles.
A method for quantifying profile completion is developed for scoring the estimated
validity of individual LinkedIn profiles using the above factors. The LinkedIn completion
scoring method takes the form of Equation 1:

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =

𝐶
500
𝑁+1

∑(𝑛) +

Where
𝑛 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒
𝑁 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝐶 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑜 500
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(2.1)

Four optional sections of the LinkedIn profile are considered: Skills, Interests,
Accomplishments, and Picture. Five hundred connections are considered for this estimate to be a
robust network. As an example of this method, a profile with data in their Skills, Interests, and
Accomplishments sections, who have a picture on their profile, and who has over 500
connections would receive a validity estimate of 100%. A profile with only a picture and 250
connections would receive a validity estimate of 30%.
Users who have completed optional steps (such as uploading a photo) may be more likely
to have accurately entered mandatory steps (such as a complete list of previous employers.) The
presence of optional sections is combined with the number of connections to produce a
completeness score.
2.3.7

Sample size
A total of 500 records were recorded: 125 managers from GM, 125 engineers from GM,

125 managers from Tesla, and 125 engineers from Tesla. After the validity filtering was applied,
233 records from GM and 244 records from Tesla were included (477 records total.) None of the
filtered records were first-degree connections to the user account used to perform the search.
The mean number of mutual connections to the user account for GM records was 2.36 (SD =
4.3), and 49% of records had zero mutual connections. The mean number of mutual connections
to the user account for Tesla records was 0.90 (SD = 1.8) and 68% of records had zero mutual
connections.
2.3.8

Demographics
Demographic information was inferred from LinkedIn profiles. Age was inferred by

assuming the employees were 18 years old at time of high school graduation; if high school
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graduation year was not available, then it was assumed that the employees were 18 years old at
time of beginning a university undergraduate program. If factors such as previous work history
made it clear that this assumption was invalid, then the age was marked as unknown.
Demographic information is shown in Error! Reference source not found..
Table 2.4

Demographics
GM

Tesla

N

N

233

244

Highest education
Total
Bachelors

80 34%

Masters

96 39%

128 55% 111 45%

PhD

14 6%

20 8%

Unknown

11 5%

17 7%

Age
Total

233

244

Unknown

37 16%

62 25%

Under 25

10 4%

6 2%

25-34

64 27% 113 46%

35-44

53 23%

52 21%

45-54

46 20%

5 2%

55-64

23 10%

5 2%

0 0%

1 0%

65+
First employer
Total

233

Current employer

109 48%

244
42 17%

Not current employer 120 52% 200 83%
Unknown

4
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2

2.3.8.2

Universities attended
The combined records from General Motors and Tesla (N = 477) included 795 bachelors,

masters, or doctoral degrees. The universities granting the greatest numbers of those degrees are
shown in Error! Reference source not found.. General Motors employees reported 409
engineering degree from 169 different universities. Tesla employees report 386 engineering
degrees from 223 different universities.
Table 2.5

2.3.8.3

Top universities by number of degrees granted
GM
University

Tesla
N University

N

Michigan

43 Cal Berkeley

11

Kettering

25 San Jose State

8

Oakland University

24 Michigan

8

Wayne State

21 USC

7

Purdue

14 Purdue

7

Ohio State

11 Carnegie Mellon

7

Lawrence Tech

11 UC San Diego

6

Western Michigan

8 Stanford

6

Indiana

7 Cal Poly

6

Renssalaer Polytechnic

6 University of Mumbai

5

Michigan Tech

6 UCLA

5

Michigan State

6 Penn State

5

Arizona State

6 Michigan State

5

Employee Retention Post-College
The first full-time employer for each employee in the sample was recorded. The number

of employees whose first full-time experience was at their current employer is listed in Error!
Reference source not found..
41

Table 2.6

Employees remaining at their first full-time employer
GM

Tesla

N

N

Total

233

244

Started at current employer

109 48% 42 17%

Started at different employer

120 52% 200 83%

Unknown
2.4

4

2

Results
The results are summarized in Error! Reference source not found..

Table 2.7

Descriptive Statistics
GM
Tesla
Employees with experience in at least one other organization
since 2010
N
233
244
Previous experience
87 (37%)
193 (79%)
No other experience
146 (63%)
51 (21%)
Average number of previous employers since 2010
N
233
244
Mean
0.61
1.47
Standard Deviation
0.95
1.26
Minimum Value
0
0
Maximum Value
4
7
Average number of previous employers for employees with
other experience since 2010
N
87
193
Mean
1.64
1.85
Standard Deviation
0.85
1.14
Minimum Value
1
1
Maximum Value
4
7
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Table 2.7 (continued)
GM
Tesla
Engineering non-managers with experience in at least one
other organization since 2010
N
124
125
Previous experience
58 (47%)
91 (73%)
No other experience
66 (53%)
34 (27%)
Engineering managers with experience in at least one other
organization since 2010
N
Previous experience
No other experience
2.4.2

109
29 (27%)
80 (73%)

119
102 (86%)
17 (14%)

Employees with previous experience in other organizations
Two groups consisting of General Motors employees and Tesla employees were studied.

The General Motors group consisted of 53% engineering non-managers and 47% engineering
managers. The Tesla group consisted of 51% engineering non-managers and 49% engineering
managers. Previous experience was considered as full-time employment experience in an
organization other than the current employer group since January 1, 2010. A Chi-square test
performed to assess the relationship of previous experience between the two groups found a
statistically significant difference, 𝜒2(1, N = 477) = 85.73, p < .001, indicating that Tesla
engineers in the study were more likely than GM engineers to have previous full-time
experience.
The General Motors and Tesla groups were then further divided into engineering
managers and engineering non-managers. A Chi-square test was performed to determine if a
significant different exists for managers and non-managers in previous employment experience.
For managers, the test statistic indicated a significant difference, 𝜒2(1, N = 228) = 81.32, p <
43

0.001, and for non-managers, a significant difference was also indicated with resulting 𝜒2(1, N =
249) = 81.315, p < 0.001. The results, indicating that Tesla engineers in the study within
separate manager and engineering non-manager groups are also more likely than GM engineers
to have previous full-time experience, are shown in Figure 2.2.

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
GM

Tesla

All employees

GM

Engineering nonmanagers

No other experience
Figure 2.2

Tesla

GM

Engineering managers

Previous experience

Prior experience among employees of GM and Tesla
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Tesla

Figure 2.3

Interaction effect within Company and Role on employees with previous
experience

The interaction effect within Company (GM, Tesla) and Role (Manager, Engineer) was
examined using a Chi-square test, 𝜒2(3, N = 477) = 99.66, p < 0.001. The relationship, shown in
Figure 2.3, indicates that at GM, engineers had a higher number of previous employers than
managers. This was opposite at Tesla. The difference was much greater at GM than at Tesla.
2.4.3

Mean number of previous employers
The General Motors and Tesla groups were compared based on the mean number of

previous organizations for employees within the sample. An independent sample t-test was
performed on the two groups. Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances did not indicate that the
assumption of equal variances holds (p < .001). A statistically significant difference was found
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between the means, t(451) = -8.37, p < .001, d = -0.77. The General Motors group had a mean of
0.61 previous employers, while the Tesla group had a mean of 1.47 previous employers.
The groups were then reduced to only include employees with at least one previous
employer since 2010. When comparing employees from the two groups who had previous
employers, the mean number of previous employers was not statistically significant, t(218) = -

1.73, p = .086, d = -0.20. The results are shown in Figure 2.4 along with error bars denoting
plus and minus two standard errors of the mean.

2.5
2
1.5
1.47

1
0.5

1.64

1.85

0.61

0
GM

Tesla

GM

All employees

Figure 2.4

Tesla

Employees with at least 1
other experience

Mean Number of Previous Employers
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Interaction effect: Company x Role on Number of Previous
Employers

Mean previous employers

Managers (mean)

Engineers (mean)

2
1.5
1
0.5
0
GM

Tesla
Company

Figure 2.5

Interaction effect within Company and Role on the mean number of previous
employers

The interaction effect within Company (GM, Tesla) and Role (Manager, Engineer) on the mean
number of previous employers, where the null hypothesis was that the number of previous
employers does not depend on either company or type of job, was tested using a Chi-square test,
𝜒2(21, N = 477) = 115.02, p < 0.001. The results, shown in Figure 2.5, indicate an interaction
effect between Company and Role such that Managers at Tesla had more previous employers
than engineering non-managers, while the opposite was true at General Motors. Error bars in
Figure 2.5 indicate two standard errors of the mean. Table 2.8 shows the mean differences
between interaction effect categories.
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Table 2.8

Interaction Effect Mean Differences
Category

Mean

Category

Mean Mean Difference

Tesla Manager 1.61 vs GM Manager

0.39

1.22

Tesla Manager 1.61 vs GM Engineer

0.81

0.8

Tesla Engineer 1.34 vs GM Manager

0.39

0.95

Tesla Engineer 1.34 vs GM Engineer

0.81

0.53

Tesla Manager 1.61 vs Tesla Engineer 1.34

0.27

GM Manager

-0.42

0.39 vs GM Engineer

0.81

The frequency of specific previous employers was compiled for the General Motors and
Tesla groups. The top five previous employers for employees of each company are shown in
Table 2.9.
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Table 2.9

Top previous employers

General Motors
Rank Company
Industry
1
Fiat Chrysler
Automotive [132]
2
Ford
Automotive [133]
3
Magna
Automotive [134]
4
TRW
Automotive [135]
(tie)
GE

5
(tie)

Continental
Tata
Nissan
Nexteer
Lear
Hyundai
Faurecia
Engineering
Technology
Associates
Eaton

Specialty
Industrial
Machinery [136]
Automotive [137]
Automotive [138]
Automotive [139]
Automotive [141]
Automotive [142]
Automotive [144]
Automotive [146]
Engineering
Services [147]

Company
Ford
Apple
SolarCity*
Toyota

Tata
Perbix
Nissan
Microsoft
General Motors
Continental
Amazon

Tesla
Industry
Automotive
Tech
Energy
Automotive

Automotive [138]
Automotive [140]
Automotive [139]
Software [143]
Automotive [145]
Automotive [137]
Online Retail
[148]

Specialty
Industrial
Machinery [149]
BAE
Aerospace &
Defense [150]
American Axle
Automotive [151]
A123 Systems
Automotive [152]
*Tesla acquired SolarCity on August 1, 2016

2.5

Discussion
General Motors and Tesla were studied as surrogates for the legacy and startup

automotive industries. Of interest was the makeup of the companies’ workforces. A pool of
records from engineers, including both managers and non-managers, were analyzed to determine
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whether one company employed a workforce with significantly more external experience than
the other.
The results showed that Tesla employees are more than twice as likely to have experience
working in other organizations than General Motors employees. This was true for both
managers and non-managers, although there was an interaction effect with role at the company.
At General Motors, managers were less likely to have external experience (27%) than nonmanagers (47%). At Tesla, the opposite was true: managers were more likely (86%) than nonmanagers (73%) to have external experience. In both cases, however, managers represented an
exaggerated version of the overall trend within the company.
Similarly, Tesla employees had a significantly higher number of previous employers than
General Motors employees. Tesla employees had an average of 1.47 previous employers, while
GM employees had an average of 0.61 previous employers. An interesting result is highlighted
by excluding employees with no previous experience and focusing only on employees who did
have experience outside of their current firm. While Tesla employees had a significantly greater
average number of previous employers, when considering only employees with external
experience, the average number of previous employers was similar for employees of both
General Motors and Tesla. In other words, employees with previous experience had about the
same number of previous employers whether they were from the GM sample or the Tesla
sample. Possible underlying reasons for this natural grouping include generational differences,
individual personalities, or employee performance. While the data may suggest that there are
two types of employees (those who change jobs frequently and those who stay at an employer
long-term), the data also indicates that there are far more of the mobile type of employees at
Tesla than at General Motors.
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When considering the top previous employers, for both General Motors and Tesla the list
is dominated by other automotive firms such as Ford and Fiat Chrysler. A difference can be
observed, however, in the non-automotive firms present on the list. For General Motors, the top
non-automotive firms represented in employee experience are primarily specialty heavy-duty
machinery manufacturers (GE, Eaton, BAE Systems). For Tesla, the non-automotive firms are
Apple, SolarCity, Microsoft, and Amazon. Tesla’s external environment, specifically located in
a well-known tech hub, likely contributes to this result.
Since Tesla is a much younger company than General Motors, for most results
employment history is only considered from January, 2010 on. However, the first reported fulltime employer for each employee was recorded, even if it was prior to 2010. About half of
General Motors engineering employees in the study sample started at GM as their first full-time
engineering employment, while 17% of Tesla engineering employees in the sample started their
careers at Tesla. General Motors had higher retention numbers even though GM employees in
the study skewed older, suggesting longer time in the workforce.
The universities attended and degrees conferred for both General Motors and Tesla were
recorded. More General Motors engineering employees in the sample had advanced degrees
(masters or Ph.D.) than Tesla employees. Tesla engineering employees in the sample had
degrees from a more diverse range of institutions (223 different universities total) than General
Motors (169 different universities total). Home-state universities are heavily represented for
both companies, filling six spots of the top ten universities list. Employees of General Motors
included in the sample, however, more frequently attended the top-listed universities; the sample
of 233 General Motors employees included 113 degrees from Detroit-area universities, and 43
from the University of Michigan alone. Tesla’s top feeder university, the University of
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California, Berkeley, only represented 11 degrees total from among 244 employees in the
sample.
Summarizing the results, Tesla employees were more likely to have worked for other
organizations, more likely to have previously worked in the tech industry, less likely to have
started at Tesla directly out of college, and less likely to have attended the same university as
their coworkers, as compared to General Motors.
One contributing factor to a more diverse workforce background is the State of
California’s ban on non-compete agreements. In many states, including Michigan, companies
can (and do) include language in employment contracts to restrict employees’ ability to leave and
immediately go to work for a competitor. California legislators and courts, however, have long
upheld employees’ right to leave one company and go to a competing company without
obstruction. A predictable outcome of this distinction is that employees in California are more
likely to move between organizations, an expectation that is seen in the results of this study.
Counter to what the non-compete factor alone would predict, however, is the finding that other
automotive companies are the most common previous employer for General Motors employees.
If non-compete agreements were a major restriction on workforce mobility, an expected finding
would be that employees are more likely to come from unrelated industries to which General
Motors is not a competitor. The likely explanation is that, in practice, non-compete agreements
are rarely adjudicated, and therefore not a complete deterrent to employee mobility.
2.5.1

Effects from the Great Recession
In the 2008-2009 timeframe, the global economy suffered a financial crisis commonly

known as the “Great Recession” [153], the effects of which were keenly felt in the US
automotive industry [154]. General Motors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on June
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8th, 2009, followed by a reorganization leading to a new IPO on November 17th, 2010 [155]. In
the years from 2010-2015, General Motors’ U.S. salaried employee numbers grew at an average
annual rate of 9.2%. General Motors does not report specific job functions for these employees,
but the bulk of the U.S.-based engineering staff is likely included. Some employee hires during
this growth period were possibly recalled employees who were originally laid off during the
bankruptcy [156]. Employment in the Michigan automotive manufacturing industry stayed
relatively stable in the years 2010-2012 [156], [157].
Since Tesla was privately owned at the time of the Great Recession, it was not required to
report financial data. Tesla did, however, seek a new private funding round during this time and
made an IPO in 2010 [158]. Tesla only reported detailed employment data for two years,
indicating 38.7% growth of salaried employees between 2011 – 2012.
The time period for the data taken for this study was from 2010-2020. Available
literature shows that large-scale perturbations in U.S. automotive industry employment due to the
Great Recession ended by 2010, indicating that the data is unlikely to be significantly influenced
by the Great Recession as a single event [156].
2.5.2

Limitations
Users of social media sites such as LinkedIn may not represent the general population,

and age, education, and other factors may affect the participation rates among different
companies. [100]. Employees not on LinkedIn as well as non-engineers are not considered in
this study. The same constraint is present for samples from both GM and Tesla. Although
significant effort was made to reduce the effect of the user’s LinkedIn profile on search results,
the LinkedIn search feature reflects a potential source of bias in sample selection.
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As with any survey response, there is no guarantee that individual responses are truthful
or accurate. Nonetheless, Guillory and Hancock found that LinkedIn resumes are more honest
than traditional (private) resumes in reporting past experience [89].
The highest level of education is included in LinkedIn profiles but is contingent on the
user entering and updating their profile.
An interesting measure not considered here could be the average tenure, or length of time
that employees stay at each organization. However, this measure is not applicable to this study
due to the relative youth of Tesla. At the time of conducting this study, Tesla has no 20+ year
veterans as the company itself is not old enough to support a tenure of that length. Tesla’s
growth also compounded the difficulty of this study; to reduce the effect of company growth on
the measurement of employee history, employment history was only considered back to 2010.
Due to the pre-captured nature of the data from online social media databases, the
individual respondents are not available for further investigation to explore potentially
significant subtrends relating to characteristics such as personality types.
2.6

Conclusions
Tesla engineering employees exhibit a greater number and wider variety of previous

employment experience than General Motors, while General Motors engineering employees tend
to have focused automotive backgrounds. General Motors and Tesla may have partially created
this effect with intentional hiring practices, but the external environment of each firm played a
large role in shaping their workforce composition. A significant difference in the number of
employees with experience in other organizations seems likely to have a broad impact on an
organization’s social system. For Tesla, specifically, the presence of non-automotive companies
within the top five previous employers can indicate a beneficial transfer of learning between
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industries who do not traditionally overlap. On the other hand, a large number of employees
from non-automotive backgrounds could lead to a lack of applied experience in the specific field
at hand and lead to steeper learning curves when expanding operations (for instance, when
ramping up production on a new model.)
2.6.1

Future Work
Future research studies could improve the value of these results by applying similar

research methods to a broader set of organizations. Tesla and General Motors likely have unique
factors that contribute to their social system; by studying other organizations, a more general
understanding of automotive industry culture could be formed. Also, study of additional
organizations within the same external environments as General Motors and Tesla can provide
reference to help isolate the influence of external versus internal factors.
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CHAPTER III
MANAGEMENT HIRING AND PROMOTION PRACTICES WITHIN TESLA AND
GENERAL MOTORS
3.1

Abstract
Culture is a key attribute for organizational performance. Every organization has a

unique culture; successful organizations have cultures that align with their organizational goals.
One way that organizations can influence their culture is by manipulation of human systems,
including hiring and promotion preferences. Some organizations reward loyalty by filling
management positions with internal candidates, while some prioritize fresh ideas and new blood
by seeking external candidates. A study was performed to quantify the ratio of internal to
external engineering management hires for both General Motors and Tesla. Data was collected
for 250 managers using the website LinkedIn.com. The study concludes that, while Tesla is
somewhat more likely to seek external candidates, most managers within both firms were
promoted from within. This suggests that, even in the startup space, stability often outweighs
innovation as a desirable cultural attribute for high organizational performance.
3.2

Introduction
Corporate hiring practices for management positions can be said to favor either internal

promotion or external recruitment. While some studies have found that most firms prefer
internal promotion [17], the specifics can be influenced by a variety of factors, including how the
previous manager vacated the position (whether by promotion or by going to a different firm)
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[19]. One motivation for favoring internal promotion is that by providing the possibility of
promotion, current employees are incentivized to work harder. By hiring externally, promotion
opportunities for existing employees are reduced, decreasing morale and work ethic [18].
Current employees provide much more opportunity for observation and therefore are a “known
quantity,” which may be attractive to more risk-averse firms. Additionally, new external hires
carry certain onboarding costs such as training, orientation and adapting to corporate cultures.
For these reasons, the criteria for hiring an external candidate over promoting an internal one
often requires the external candidate to be not just better, but substantially better [17]. Research
has also shown that larger firms are more likely to promote from within; bigger companies are
more likely to find suitable managers for promotion, due to a larger pool of internal candidates
[18].
General Motors is an established automaker with a long history and was, for several
decades, the biggest automaker in the world. GM was chosen for this study to represent the
“legacy” U.S. auto industry, which was defined by the following characteristics:
•

Geographically concentrated in the U.S. Midwest

•

A tightly linked and highly clustered supplier base, most of which are also located
within the U.S. Midwest [2]

•

Unionized manufacturing workforce [159]

•

Product portfolio heavy on conventional, gas-powered, large vehicles such as
trucks and SUVs [160]

•

Shareholders who expect regular profit distributions

•

Distribution and consumer sales handled through a network of franchised dealers
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Tesla, on the other hand, is a relatively young company. Despite this, it is a company
which is commonly ranked as one of the most admired brands in the world, and its customers are
passionate ambassadors for its products. Tesla was chosen to represent the “new” U.S. auto
industry, to which was attributed the following general characteristics:
•

Geographically concentrated on the West Cost

•

A wider supplier base with less mature relationships, and more willingness to
vertically integrate [124], [161], [162]

3.2.1

•

Non-union workforce

•

Product portfolio of advanced, electrified vehicles [163]

•

Share prices based on future earnings potential

•

Direct-to-consumer distribution and sales

•

Priority placed on innovation over manufacturing [161]

Culture and the Social System
All these factors contribute to a firm’s performance and to its culture. Culture is defined

as “a pattern of basic assumption- invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it
learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration- that has worked
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” [112]. Culture has been recognized as
one of the key factors influencing enterprise performance [14], [113], [164], [165]. According to
Pasmore, “[…] all organizations possess cultures, whether or not they are apparent or wellarticulated” [107]. Culture change is a popular phrase but is a very difficult task to achieve. Due
to the influence of external factors, there are relatively few levers that executives really have in
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order to influence culture and, therefore, performance. One is through overt messaging: mission
and vision statements, executive speeches, etc. Another example is employing different teaming
strategies to encourage autonomy or control of work groups. A third and very powerful way that
organizations influence culture is in human relations practices, specifically how management
positions are filled.
3.2.2

Promotion Practices
Employees are generally expected to begin their careers in non-supervisory roles, moving

up over time into either supervisory or senior technical roles depending on their specific aptitude.
Some ambitious employees find an organization and move up the ranks quickly, while others
move up by bouncing between different organizations. Some find themselves in management
roles but strive to get back to the research and convert to a technical track [166]. Employees
with highly specialized, technology skills may be in demand and offered frequent promotions as
incentive to stay. As a result of these personnel movements, the organizations themselves are
affected. Organizations who prioritize internal candidates for promotion are encouraging
loyalty. Organizations who regularly seeks out external candidates may be prioritizing
innovation through knowledge transfer from external sources. In either case, if the philosophy
takes hold across all levels of management, then it becomes a culture [167].
The two organizations identified earlier are considered as examples of the legacy and the
startup automotive industry. A study of their managers was performed to attempt to determine
what differences might exist in their HR practices for hiring managers.
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3.3

Methods

3.3.1

Data sources
LinkedIn.com, a social networking site used by professionals, was used to collect data on

current and previous employment history. LinkedIn allows users to create profiles containing
education, experience, interests, etc. and facilitates networking through the connection of
colleagues. The data categories of user profiles is shown in Table 3.1.
Summary of LinkedIn Digital Resume Categories.

Accomplishments

Background

Table 3.1

Profile category
Name
Region
Industry
Intro
About
Skills
Background: work experience
Background: education
Background: licenses and certifications
Background: volunteer experience
Accomplishments: publications
Accomplishments: patents
Accomplishments: courses
Accomplishments: projects
Accomplishments: honors and awards
Accomplishments: test scores
Accomplishments: languages
Accomplishments: organizations

A pilot study was conducted to determine the feasibility of the proposed work. For the
pilot study, 100 profiles were recorded, including 50 from current General Motors employees
and 50 from current Tesla employees. During the pilot study, nearly all available data from the
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profiles was recorded in order to provide the opportunity to explore which data fields are useful.
The pilot study also informed the search and sampling methods used in the final data collection.
3.3.2

Searching for relevant profiles
The control variables were managed using the LinkedIn search feature to retrieve profiles

matching a desired set of criteria by using multiple search filters. The primary search keyword
was “engineer.” The results were filtered to only include personal pages (“people”) and exclude
other page types like “companies” or “jobs.” Job titles were filtered to only include management
roles. This search was performed twice, with General Motors and Tesla for current company.
The search parameters are summarized in Table 3.2. An example of this search method is shown
in Figure 3.1.
Table 3.2

Search features used on LinkedIn.

Search Parameter

Entry

Keyword

“engineer”

Current companies

“General Motors” or “Tesla”

Type

People

Title

"manager OR director OR president OR chief OR VP"
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Figure 3.1

LinkedIn search example.

The “current company” filter box automatically searches for companies with LinkedIn
pages, reducing the likelihood that profiles are unintentionally excluded due to differences in
human data entry (i.e. employees listing their current employer as GM instead of General
Motors.)
Since the author’s LinkedIn account was used to facilitate the search, steps were taken in
the search procedure to reduce bias resulting from direct connections. The exact parameters of
the LinkedIn search algorithm are not known, but search results can be observed to first list
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profiles who are a 1st degree connection to the searcher. By adding multiple search filters and
creating a more specific search, however, the effect seems to be reduced.
A LinkedIn search returns 100 pages were 10 profiles on each page. Thirteen pages were
randomly selected using a random number generator and all 10 profiles were recorded from each
selected page (with the exception of the last page, where only the first five profiles were
recorded), resulting in 125 results. The random page selection process was repeated separately
for General Motors and Tesla.
3.3.3

Selecting relevant data
From the pilot study, a reduced set of data fields was determined to be the most useful for

this study. Those categories are shown in Table 3.3.
The degree of connection with the author as well as the number of mutual connections
were recorded in order to gage the influence of the author’s connections on the data. The
number of total connections and relative completeness of the profiles were recorded in order to
estimate data quality. Other data recorded included past employers, management status, past
management status, and information on past promotions. The date that the profile was recorded
was also captured.
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Table 3.3

Parameters recorded from LinkedIn.

Data column

Description

Entry #
Date retrieved
Degree of
Connection
Connections

Unique number for each profile.
Date that the data was retrieved
Degree of connection to the profile. 1 = connection, 2 =
connection of connection, etc.
Number of connections of the respondent
Number of followers of the respondent. This is only available
Followers
if the respondent produces content (posts, shares, etc.)
Mutual
Number of mutual connections between me and the
connections
respondent
List of every current and past employer (final study included
Employer
since 2010 only)
Title
List of every current and past job title
Stratified Title
Manually stratified job titles
Location
Location of job titles (if available.)
Start date
Start date for each job title
End date
End date for each job title. "Present" if current title.
Education
University for each engineering degree conferred.
Education
Physical main campus of each university listed under
Location
"Education." Determined by Google search.
Whether or not the respondent has populated the "skills"
Skills
section of the profile with any data.
Whether or not the respondent has populated the
Accomplishments "accomplishments" section of the profile with any data.
Whether or not the respondent has populated the "interests"
Interests
section of the profile with any data.
Picture
Whether or not the respondent has uploaded a picture
Profile
Completion
Calculated metric estimating the profile completion
3.3.4

Pilot Final
study study
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Data collection and analysis
Two hundred and fifty total manager profiles were recorded, including 125 from General

Motors and 125 from Tesla. The data was hand-coded into a Google Sheets spreadsheet.
Statistical analysis was performed using IBM SPSS 26. Statistical significance was based on an
α ≤ .05 threshold [131].
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3.3.5

Secondary coding
After the primary data was collected it was made more useful through a sequence of

secondary coding steps. The first was standardizing and stratifying job titles. Many of the
LinkedIn profiles reviewed use lengthy, descriptive job titles. These titles were matched to a list
of 16 stratified job titles:
•

Chief Engineer

•

Chief Officer

•

Director

•

Engineer

•

Executive Director

•

Lead/Principal Engineer

•

Manager

•

President

•

Program Manager

•

Project Manager

•

Senior Director

•

Senior Engineer

•

Senior Manager

•

Supervisor

•

Team Leader

•

Vice President

For example, any of the following profile job titles would be stratified as “Chief Engineer”:
•

Executive Chief Engineer, New Technology
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3.3.6

•

Chief Engineer- Autonomous Vehicles

•

Assistant Chief Engineer

•

Global Vehicle Chief Engineer

•

Chief Program Engineer

Exclusion/selection criteria
For this study, only those who are (or have been) classified as managers are considered.

Managers are considered those with one of the following stratified titles:

3.3.7

•

Chief Engineer

•

Chief Officer

•

Director

•

Manager

•

President

•

Program Manager

•

Senior Director

•

Senior Manager

•

Vice President

Determining promotion or external hiring
After non-managers are excluded, the work history of each profile is examined to

determine if managers were promoted from within or hired as external candidates. Table 3.4
shows a fictional example of a director position filled by a current manager (who was also
previously promoted from an engineer position). Table 3.5 shows an example of a director
position being filled by an external hire.
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Table 3.4

Example of manager promoted from within (most recent position listed first).

Employee A

Employer Title
Director- Vehicle Systems Engineering
Acme

Table 3.5

Program Engineering Manager

Manager

Design Release Engineer

Engineer

Battery Control Design Engineer

Engineer

Example of external manager hire (most recent position listed first).

Employee B

Employer

3.3.8

Stratified Title
Director

Tesla

Title
Director

Stratified Title
Director

Apple

Director

Director

Intel

VP Architecture

Vice President

Microsoft

Senior Hardware Engineer

Senior Engineer

Validity

One challenge of mining data from profiles that were pre-filled by users is that it is difficult to
detect if relevant information, such as work history, has been omitted. Grading the completeness
of online digital resumes has been compared to gauging the completeness of a Wikipedia page
[168]. Reasons for incompleteness of job history data on LinkedIn might include:
•

When LinkedIn profile was created, only the most recent job experience was
added

•

Previous employers are no longer in business and therefore may not have an
“auto-complete” option in the LinkedIn database

•

User only listing last job title at each former employer

•

User engaged in unreported “moonlighting”
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A review of publications based on studies of LinkedIn data found none that explicitly addressed
the issue of completeness of data or presented any method to account for incomplete data [121],
[129], [169], [170]. Howison et al. make the case that sampled social media data sets are in fact
much more complete than many traditional observational forms of data collection [95].
3.4

Results
The results are summarized in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6

Descriptive Statistics
Tesla

GM

Path to current position
N
109
119
Hired as manager
25
23%
44
37%
Promoted to
management
84
77%
75
63%
Managers' role in previous organization
N
29
102
Manager
9
31%
38
37%
Non-manager
20
69%
64
63%
Managers’ role in previous organization when hired as managers
N
14
42
Manager
6
43%
26
62%
Non-manager
8
57%
16
38%
Managers role in previous organization when promoted to
management
N
15
60
Manager
3
20%
12
20%
Non-manager
12
80%
48
80%
Mean number of promotions
Mean
2.56
0.96
3.4.2

Managers promoted to management or hired as managers
Two groups consisting of engineering managers from General Motors and Tesla were

considered. Managers, as defined as described in Section 3.3.5, were considered to have been
“hired as managers” if their first position in the company was a management position. They
were classified as “promoted to management” if they previously held a non-management
position within the company. A Chi-square test indicated statistical significance between the
General Motors and Tesla groups, 𝜒2(1, N = 228) = 5.51, p = 0.021, indicating that more Tesla
managers were hired as managers. The results, shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, indicate that
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77% of GM engineering managers and 63% of Tesla engineering managers were promoted into
management position instead of hired in as managers.

Figure 3.2

GM managers’ path to management.

Figure 3.3

Tesla managers’ path to management.
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3.4.3

Managers’ role in previous organizations
Considering managers from General Motors and Tesla, it was studied what role the

managers had in any previous organizations. The data was tested using a Chi-square test,
indicating no significant difference between General Motors and Tesla in this regard.
3.4.4

Managers role in previous organizations when hired as managers
The General Motors and Tesla managers who were hired as managers were classified

based on what type of position they left to come to General Motors or Tesla. The difference in
the two groups was non-significant, 𝜒2(1, N = 56) = 1.56, p = 0.212.
3.4.5

Managers role in previous organizations when promoted to management
Considering managers who were promoted to management but had previous experience

in other organizations, the results were not statistically significant, 𝜒2(1, N = 75) = 0, p = 1.00.
Noteworthy is that 2.8% of GM managers and 10% of Tesla managers initially joined as nonmanagers after being managers in their previous position.
3.4.6

Average number of promotions
General Motors and Tesla managers were studied to see if there is a significant difference

in the number of times they were promoted to other management positions. The average number
of promotions per manager, shown in Figure 3.4, indicates that General Motors managers were
promoted more over 2.5 times more frequently. The data was analyzed using SPSS using an
independent sample t-test, t(142) = 7.31, p < 0.001, d = 1.00. Error is shown using two standard
errors of the mean.
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Number of Promotions

4
3
2

2.56

1
0.958
0
GM

Figure 3.4

3.5

Tesla
Company

Average number of promotions per manager.

Discussion
Culture is an important attribute to organizational performance. While largely influenced

by an organization’s external environment, one important way that culture can be affected is by
the selection of managers. Specifically, by choosing either internal or external candidates to fill
open management positions, organizations can have an impact on their culture.
The data show that managers at Tesla are about 50% more likely to have been hired from
outside the company than General Motors; however, at both General Motors and Tesla, most of
the managers studied were promoted from within. When management positions were filled from
outside, Tesla and General Motors differed in the type of candidates they hired: General Motors
most frequently hired engineers who were previously in non-management roles, while Tesla
most frequently hired engineers previously in management roles. Several managers (about 3%
for GM and about 10% for Tesla) initially took a step down to get into the company before being
promoted back into management.
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There was a significant difference in the number of management promotions that each
manager saw between General Motors and Tesla. The General Motors managers studied had
been promoted to a different management position an average of 2.56 times. The greater number
of promotions for General Motors managers could be related to greater vertical differentiation
within General Motors. Tesla managers were promoted to a management position an average of
0.958 times (the value is less than 1 due to managers who were hired as managers and have not
been promoted since.) The smaller value recorded for Tesla is likely related to an overall flatter
organizational structure within Tesla.
At the beginning of this study it was suggested that startup firms such as Tesla might be
more likely to promote a culture of innovation by regularly seeking outside management talent
with diverse experience and perspectives. While this is true in comparison to General Motors,
even at Tesla most managers are promoted from within. The findings suggest that there is a
practical limit to the practice of filling management positions with outside candidates.
Management hiring strategies can be a significant way to influence sociotechnical
systems change. If General Motors and Tesla are taken as examples of the legacy and startup
automotive industries, then it could be concluded that automotive startup firms in earlier lifecycle stages value innovation over employee loyalty.
3.5.1

Differentiation
General Motors is considered an M-form, multidivisional organization due to its complex

structure separating groups by region, function, and type [171], [172]. Multidivisional
organization is common in organizations in the final maturity stage. Tesla’s organization is Uform, or functional, with significant centralization; this is common in organizations in the
entrepreneurial and collectivity stages [60]. General Motors’ structure inherently leads to more
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managers and greater vertical differentiation, as seen in the average number of promotions data
from this study.
3.5.2

Limitations
The data used for this study are taken from user-populated fields, and as such can be

incomplete or inaccurate. Studies have found that, while people are just about as likely to be
dishonest on their LinkedIn resumes than on traditional resumes, they are more honest on
concrete facts (i.e. employment history) on their LinkedIn profiles, while they are more likely to
embellish hobbies and interests [89].
The demographics of social media users is different for each social media platform and
may affect the participation rates for both GM and Tesla [130]. Also, due to the data collection
method of mining existing databases, individual subjects are not available to seek follow-up or
additional information.
Gauging the impact of employee turnover on promotion statistics is difficult. Since only
current General Motors and Tesla employees were studied, data is not available on how
management positions were vacated.
3.6

Conclusions
Organizations influence culture by either hiring external candidates or promoting internal

candidates for management positions. Engineering managers from both General Motors and
Tesla are most likely to have been promoted from internal non-management positions, although
Tesla was somewhat more likely to bring in new engineering hires as managers. Internal
candidates are a known quantity and often already understand the requirements of a management
position, making them attractive for promotion. Internal candidates are often also easier and less
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expensive to recruit and hire. By promoting from within, companies maintain continuity, which
helps maintain the existing culture. The startup automotive industry has, so far, adopted
traditional industry tendencies of promoting from within.
3.6.1

Future Work
Future studies could expand the sample size in order to try to capture more nuanced

differences at the α = 0.05 level. A larger sample size could also allow for analysis of different
management levels, distinguishing the effects between executive and lower management. A
study involving additional organizations could also improve the general applicability of the
results.

75

CHAPTER IV
EMPLOYEE PERCEPTION OF CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES WITHIN TESLA AND
GENERAL MOTORS
4.1

Abstract
Measuring culture within an organization is a useful tool for managers who would

implement sociotechnical systems change. While it can be difficult to measure organizational
culture directly, employee perception of culture can provide a useful surrogate. Data from
employee-posted company reviews on the website Glassdoor.com were collected for both
General Motors and Tesla. A novel method was employed which combines both Likert scaletype data and open-form comments to produce measurable data on employee perception of
specific cultural attributes, such as stability, satisfaction, and work/life balance. Results showed
that engineering employees of General Motors and Tesla each see their employers with different
attributes, some organic and some likely intentional creations by corporate management. Results
also suggest that employee-defined attribute importance differs between each company.
4.2
4.2.1

Introduction
Culture
E.H. Schein defined organizational culture as “a pattern of basic assumption- invented,

discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration- that has worked well enough to be considered valid and,
therefore, taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to
76

those problems” [112]. You cannot see culture when you walk into a firm, but the results of the
culture may be seen in employee interactions, attitudes, and even dress code. Organizational
culture is analogous to human personality: it is established from preceding factors but is shaped
by events and circumstances, it is responsible to a great degree for success or failure, and each
one is unique.
Culture has been shown to be linked with financial performance [113], [164], [165].
Barney found that firms with “valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable” cultures can be a
competitive advantage for firms [113], [173]. It has been shown the culture is significantly
influenced by management [13]; in fact, Schein said “the only thing of real importance that
leaders do is to create and manage culture.” [112]
4.2.2

Affecting cultural change
If the executive leadership of an enterprise want to alter the organization’s culture, goals,

or values, there are a limited number of levers to pull. One is choosing which managers to hire.
By promoting internally or by hiring externally, and by choosing certain characteristics of new
hires, firms send messages about what is important [18]. Firms may even hire and encourage
certain managers to be “change agents” [174], [175]. They may also incentivize, financially or
otherwise, certain behaviors or outcomes. For example, in a recent testimony before the U.S.
Senate, pharmaceutical company AbbVie Chairman and CEO Richard Gonzalez confirmed that
part of his executive compensation package includes bonuses tied to the sales revenue of a given
drug, Humira. AbbVie’s patent on Humira has allowed the company to double the price of the
drug since 2014, a predictable outcome given the company’s implicit goals (as indicated by the
incentive structure) but one which also limits access to the drug for some patients [176]. In
another example of an enterprise attempting to affect change, in 1986 Whirlpool CEO Jack
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Sparks commissioned an elaborate Broadway-style play based on Whirlpool’s 75-year history
and sent the production on tour to Whirlpool facilities around the U.S. Embedded in the story
were the three key cultural messages that Sparks wanted to seed in the company [177].
4.2.3

Employee views on culture in the automotive industry
Two companies are chosen to compare for this study: General Motors and Tesla. General

Motors is, in many ways, representative of a certain legacy class of automotive company.
General Motors shares many of the same external environment factors as Ford and other
Midwestern suppliers and commercial vehicle companies. Tesla is not only geographically
removed from the Detroit area but also philosophically removed; while General Motors and Ford
dutifully strive to earn money for the shareholders, Tesla openly admits to motivations of
societal change. How do their employees respond to the differences (and similarities) of each
organization’s internal and external environment, and how does each influence the social system
responsible for affecting culture and organizational performance?
4.3

Methods
Glassdoor.com survey responses were used to explore cultural attributes of General

Motors and Tesla.
4.3.1

Glassdoor as a data source
Glassdoor.com is an anonymous employer rating site which also provides crowdsourced

salary statistics and recruitment services for firms. Users of the site may view reviews written by
current and former employees of a company, however the number of reviews which can be
accessed is initially limited. Full access is only provided once a user contributes by providing a
review of their own. Reviews take the form of a survey, with fixed questions and numeric
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scoring criteria. The Glassdoor.com database contains survey responses from both current and
former employees.
The Glassdoor.com database includes both numeric and textual responses, each of which
can provide useful insight. Survey participants rate the company on several attributes according
to a 5-point Likert scale. Participants also provide comments on the pros and cons of working
for the company, along with advice to management. If the Likert scale data is used, then the data
categories are already defined by the survey response categories: culture and values, work/life
balance, career opportunities, compensation and benefits, senior management, and CEO rating.
If written comments are used, then the comments must be sorted and a categorization method
defined. The literature studied uses both methods; a summary of other studies using similar data
parsing techniques is shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
Author

Summary of studies
Records Type
reviewed of data
Glassdoor.com 38,000
Likert
scale

Topic

Huang
2015
[178]

Glassdoor.com 102,888

Linking family
control to
financial
performance

Moniz
[179]

Glassdoor.com 417,645

Guiso
2015
[180]

Corporate
websites

Luo
[126]

Glassdoor.com 257,454

Dabirian
2017
[127]

Data source

500

Dimensions
analyzed
Social value
Interest value
Application value
Development value
Economic value
Management value
Work/life balance
Likert
Company rating
scale
(overall)
Career opportunities
Compensation and
benefits
Work/life balance
Senior management
CEO rating
Textual Culture and values
Work/life balance
Career Opportunities
Compensation and
Benefits
Senior management
Textual Integrity
Teamwork
Innovation
Respect
Quality
Safety
Citizenship
Communication
Reward
Textual Integrity
Teamwork
Innovation
Respect
Quality
Safety
Citizenship
Communication
Reward
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Social media as
feedback
mechanism for
employer
improvement

Linking Goalsetting with
future earnings

Linking
integrity with
financial
performance

Use of
Glassdoor as a
data source

Glassdoor survey records include 19 fields (Table 4.2), including six contextual fields (job title,
date, etc.), nine quantitative rating fields, and four written response fields. Fifteen fields are
required, including three of the written response fields. If data is missing from a particular
Glassdoor survey response, then we know that data is missing because there are blank fields.
The Glassdoor survey instrument can be found in the Appendix.
Summary of Questionnaire Fields from Glassdoor.com Employment Survey

4.3.2

Survey category
Date of Response
Job Category
Job Title
Years with company
Location
Current employee?
Recommend to a friend?
6-month business outlook
CEO job performance
Overall (1-5)
Work/life balance
Culture & Values
Career Opportunities
Compensation and Benefits
Senior Management
Headline
Pros
Cons

Example
1/1/1900
Engineering
Mechanical Design Engineer
8 to 10
Detroit, MI
Yes
Yes
Neutral
Positive
4
3
5
2
3
4
Up to 120 characters
Up to 5000 characters
Up to 5000 characters

Advice to Management

Up to 5000 characters

Likert ratings

Textual data Quantitative data

Contextual data

Table 4.2

Data search methods on Glassdoor
The Glassdoor.com website has pages dedicated to major companies such as General

Motors and Tesla. The companies have some control over what appears on their company pages
(primarily as a recruiting tool,) but no control over the reviews which are linked from the page.
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Glassdoor’s interface allows review filtering based on the parameters of job function, language,
full time/part time, and location. Using the site’s filtering functionality, reviews for both Tesla
and General Motors were filtered to only include full-time engineering positions written in the
United States. An example of the review search interface is shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1

Glassdoor.com review search interface
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4.3.3

Data Entry
Data was manually recorded into a Google Sheets spreadsheet. All data fields from

reviews were included. Each review on the Glassdoor site has a dedicated URL, which was also
recorded so that individual reviews can be revisited to check accuracy. A snapshot of the
manually recorded review database is seen in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2

4.3.4

Glassdoor review database

Parsing Glassdoor open-form survey data
A pilot set of 50 Glassdoor reviews were considered. The open-form text responses from

these surveys were attempted to be mapped to the Guiso et. al. categories of cultural attributes
[180]. It was found that survey responses did not often use the keywords associated with the
Guiso et. al. categories, and the categories were not representative of what the responses
frequently discussed. Using an iterative process where categories and keywords were added or
modified and the text data was re-parsed, a system of categories and keywords was developed
which provides a good fit with the responses. The first five categories were intentionally the
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same as the Likert scale categories, allowing results from the two data forms to be compared.
The remaining categories are collections of the most frequently mentioned keywords in the pilot
data set. The data parsing categories and keywords are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3

Data parsing categories and keywords

Category

Keywords

Work/life Balance

Hours, Pace, Overtime, Burn out, Intense, Overworked, Weekend,

Culture

Environment, Mood, Conflict, Stress, Morale, Atmosphere

Career Opportunities
Compensation and
Benefits

Advancement, Opportunities, Move, Learn, Experience, Future,

Senior Management

Higher-up Management, Leadership, Top-down, Executive,

Stability

Layoffs, Turnover, Stability, Retention, Security
Politics, Bureaucracy, Organized, Games, Process, Pettiness,
Communication, Clarity, Transparency

Efficiency
Innovation
Job Satisfaction
Mission

Pay, Insurance, Stock, Incentive, Salary, Bonus,

Technology, Creativity, Products, Quality
Engaging, Challenging, Interesting, Fun, Meaningful, Passionate,
Exciting, Pace, Autonomy

Respect

Vision, Direction, Impactful, Ideology, Cause
Care, Equality, Diversity, Value, Favorite, Recognition, Reward,
Support, Appreciation, Fairness

Teams / Coworkers

People, Sense of Team, Camaraderie

For each Glassdoor survey response reviewed, if the response addressed any of the keywords in a
positive way, then a “+1” is recorded in the respective category. If the response mentions any of
the keywords in a negative way, it is recorded as a “-1“. Categories are left blank if not
addressed in a particular response. If comments are unclear or contradictory, then the category is
also left blank Some examples of comments and their coding are seen in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4

Example comments and their coding

Comment
“Excessive Politics to get something done”

Category
Efficiency

“Good Pay, good bonus”

Compensation and
Benefits
Senior Management

+1

Job Satisfaction
Respect
Teams / Coworkers

+1
-1
-1

Culture

-1

“Top level management seems to be out of
touch”
“meaningful projects”
“Company doesn't care about employees”
“personalities superior attitudes and
predominates”
“Loss of direction and reward”
4.3.5

Rating
-1

-1

Likert scale data
The Glassdoor survey includes five specific categories plus one overall 1-5 Likert scale

questions. The scale responses on the Glassdoor survey instrument are formatted as stars, with
no defined rubric or description for each rating.
4.3.6

Sample Size and Data Analysis
Two hundred survey responses were collected, including 100 for General Motors and 100

for Tesla. Data was analyzed using statistical tests found in IBM SPSS 26.
4.4

Results
From the 200 reviews that were collected, a total of 601 text comments were recorded

across 12 categories. A Chi-square test was performed using IBM SPSS 26 in order to assess
statistical significance; the test statistic results are seen in Table 4.5. Five of the categories
indicated statistical significance between GM and Tesla. A descriptive statistic called “ratio”
was used to describe the ratio of positive to negative comments. Ratio is calculated according to
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Equation 2 below, where 1 would represent only positive comments and -1 would represent only
negative comments.

𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =

(𝑁𝑝 − 𝑁𝑛 )
(𝑁𝑝 + 𝑁𝑛 )

(4.1)

Where
𝑁𝑝 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑛 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
Table 4.5

Textual comment parsing statistics
GM

Tesla

Asymp.Sig
Positive Negative
Positive Negative
(2-tailed)
comment comment Ratio comment comment Ratio N p-value
Work/life
Balance
Culture
Career
Opportunities
Compensation
and Benefits
Senior
Management

18
9

15

0.09

2

35 -0.89 70

<.001

20 -0.38

6

18 -0.50 53

0.627

18

10

0.29

27

5 0.69 60

0.073

54

1

0.96

22

11 0.33 88

<.001

1

20 -0.90

2

19 -0.81 42

0.549

Stability

1

17 -0.89

1

15 -0.88 34

0.932

Efficiency

0

26 -1.00

1

20 -0.90 47

0.261

Innovation
Job
Satisfaction

5

8 -0.23

18

0 1.00 31

<.001

7

5

0.17

32

1 0.94 45

.001

Mission

0

6 -1.00

20

1 0.90 27

<.001

Respect
Teams /
Coworkers

1

24 -0.92

2

21 -0.83 48

0.502

27

1 0.93 56

0.084

23

5

0.64
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The Likert scale results are shown in Table 4.6. Four of six categories indicated
statistical significance as indicated by a Mann-Whitney U test.
Table 4.6

Likert response results
GM

Mean SD
Overall
Work/life
balance
Culture &
Values
Career
Opportunities
Compensation
and Benefits
Senior
Management

4.4.2
4.4.2.1

Tesla
Mean
rank Mean SD

Mean
rank

N

Asymp.Sig
(2-tailed) pvalue

3.00 1.393 93.33 3.36 1.259 107.67

200

0.073

3.28 1.173 116.3 2.53 1.251 83.87

198

<0.001

2.70 1.43 92.73 3.00 1.456 106.13

196

0.093

2.97 1.266 84.65 3.63 1.258 114.35

196

<0.001

4.00 0.897 111.29 3.48 1.202 88.83

198

0.004

2.38 1.38

197

0.03

90.8 2.79 1.431 108.03

Significant differences
Work/life Balance
In the category of work/life balance, textual responses were tested using a Chi-square

test, 𝜒2(1, N = 70) = 20.64, p < .001, while Likert responses were tested using a Mann-Whitney
test, U = 3336, n1 = 98, n2 = 100, p < .001, r = -0.13. Tesla responses showed a much greater
ratio of negative to positive comments than General Motors. Tesla Likert scale results also
showed lower ratings in the category of work/life balance than General Motors.

87

4.4.2.2

Career Opportunities
Career opportunities did not show a difference that met the α = 0.05 threshold for

significance as evaluated through a Chi-square test, 𝜒2(1, N = 60) = 3.21, p = .073, based on
textual responses between General Motors and Tesla, while Likert scale results did show a
significant difference U = 3430, n1 = 97, n2 = 99, p < .001, r = -0.27. Reviewers provided a
greater ratio of positive comments for Tesla than for General Motors as well as higher Likert
scale ratings for Tesla than for General Motors in this category.
4.4.2.3

Compensation and Benefits
Both textual responses, 𝜒2(1, N = 88) = 17.39, p < .001, and Likert scale responses, U =

3832, n1 = 98, n2 = 100, p = .004, r = -0.20, indicated a significant difference between General
Motors and Tesla in the category of compensation and benefits. General Motors responses
indicated a strong positive attitude toward compensation and benefits in both textual and Likert
data, while Tesla responses indicated a less strong, but also positive, attitude toward
compensation and benefits in both text and Likert data.
4.4.2.4

Senior Management
Both Tesla and General Motors responses indicated poor ratings for Senior Management,

with a statistical difference only being exhibited in the Likert responses, U = 4047, n1 = 97, n2 =
100, p < .03, r = -.16, where General Motors responses ranked senior management lower than
Tesla.
4.4.2.5

Innovation
Innovation was not included in the Likert questions and so is only represented by textual

data. A Chi-square test indicated a significant difference, 𝜒2(1, N = 31) = 14.93, p < .001,
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between General Motors and Tesla in the Innovation category. Innovation at General Motors
was generally referenced poorly, while comments relating to Innovation from Tesla responses
were uniformly positive.
4.4.2.6

Job Satisfaction
Job satisfaction was likewise not included in the Likert questions but was often

referenced in the comments; a Chi-square test indicated a significant difference between General
Motors and Tesla, 𝜒2(1, N = 45) = 11.37, p < .001. Tesla responses frequently mentioned job
satisfaction in a positive context while General Motors responses mentioned job satisfaction less
frequently although still slightly more positively than negatively.
4.4.2.7

Mission
Similarly to Job Satisfaction, Mission (and related keywords) were commented on more

often and more positively by Tesla responses than General Motors responses with a significant
difference indicated by a Chi-square test, 𝜒2(1, N = 27) = 22.04, p < .001.
1.1.1

Defining attributes
For each company, certain variables had more (and more uniform) comments. For

General Motors, the most-referenced positive attribute was Compensation and Benefits, followed
by Team/Coworkers and Career Opportunities. The categories most referenced negatively were
Efficiency, Respect, Senior Management, and Stability. General Motors Likert responses
similarly gave the highest scores to Compensation and Benefits and the lowest scores to Senior
Management.
For Tesla, positively-referenced categories included Job Satisfaction, Team/Coworkers,
Career Opportunities, Mission, and Innovation while negatively-referenced categories were
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Work/life Balance, Respect, Efficiency, and Senior Management. Tesla Likert-scale responses
provided the highest ratings to Career Opportunities and the lowest ratings to Work/life Balance.
The results for both can be seen in Figure 4.3, where bars indicate both positive and
negative references. Figure 4.4 shows the Likert response data, where the number corresponds to
the mean number of stars assigned to each category by reviewers. Figure 4.4 also includes error
bars showing two standard errors of the mean.

Figure 4.3

Parsed text data: responses for cultural attributes
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GM

Tesla

Likert scale response mean values

5.0

4.0
4.0
3.6
3.4

3.0
3.0

3.0
2.5

3.0

2.8

2.7
2.4

2.0

1.0

0.0
Overall

Figure 4.4

4.4.3

3.5

3.3

*
Work/life
balance

Culture &
Values

*
Career
Opportunities

*

Compensation
and Benefits

*

Senior
Management

Likert scale response means (* indicates significant difference)

Most important attributes
Certain categories received the most attention across both companies, as indicated by

higher N values in Table 4.5. The five most-discussed attributes (out of twelve) are shown in
Table 4.7. While Culture itself was included as a category, many of the categories are attributes
of culture; this study aims to go deeper than good or bad culture to what specific attributes define
it.
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Table 4.7

Most-referenced Attributes
Rank Attribute
1
2
3
4
5

4.4.4

Compensation and Benefits
Work/life Balance
Career Opportunities
Team/Coworkers
Culture

Number of Comments
(N)
88
70
60
56
53

Compensation and Benefits factors
Compensation and Benefits received the most comments in textual responses. It also is

one of the categories that an organization has significant control over. For these reasons, a more
detailed analysis was performed on this category. Each individual Compensation and Benefits
comment was broken down into specific keywords relating to Pay/Salary, Benefits,
Vacation/Holidays, Discounts/Raises/Stocks/Bonus, Insurance/Health/Medical, Free Food, and
401k/retirement. This resulted in more comments than in Table 4.7, because if a reviewer listed
“Good salary and benefits,” then this was listed as a general positive comment about that
company’s compensation and benefits, but would be recorded separately under “Pay/Salary” and
“Benefits” in this more detailed analysis. Figure 4.5 shows the results of the detailed
Compensation and Benefits analysis.
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401k/retirement

60%

Free food

50%
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40%
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GM (96)

Tesla (38)

Positive comments

Figure 4.5

4.5

GM (1)

Tesla (16)

Negative comments

Compensation and Benefits detailed analysis

Discussion
Two different data types were used to compare how employees view culture: 5-point

Likert-scale responses to predefined categories and open-form textual comments. The comments
were parsed into positive and negative references in specific categories. The two data types
generally agreed in the categories in which they overlapped. Example survey comments
presented throughout this section were selected based on their descriptive value as a means to
understand the results at a deeper level.
Several categories showed significant differences between General Motors and Tesla. In
the area of Work/Life Balance, both Likert and parsed-text results showed a significant
difference in how employees view each company. General Motors employees ranked Work/Life
Balance as positive in open-form text comments, while Tesla employees ranked Work/Life
balance as negative in open-form text comments. General Motors employees also rated
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Work/Life Balance statistically significantly higher than Tesla employees on a Likert scale.
Some examples of survey comments are shown in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8

Example Work/Life Balance comments

General Motors
Tesla
• “Good balance between work and
• “Definitely a culture of keep working more
family.”
hours and that’s all that matters.”
• “Easy work and decent work life
• “Work life balance is given no consideration,
balance for new grads, people with
expect to be at work/on call 24/7, even worse
young children or elderly parents,
when you are good at your job.”
people with low energy careers, or
• “Work life balance: You have to put in the
going back to school part-time.”
hours and go above and beyond that sometimes.
• “Good work/life balance,
Everyone does it so it doesn't feel too bad. If
including generous vacation time
you decide to work for Tesla, be ready to
and management encouragement
work!”
to use all vacation.”
• “3 to 4 days off never feels like enough for the
amount of soul sucking this place does to you.
I've been burnt out, re-ignited by my own
doing, only to be burnt out just as quickly.”
Tesla employees rated Career Opportunities higher than General Motors employees in
both parsed-text and Likert scale results. The differences were significant in the Likert results
and in the parsed-text results. Some example of comments related to Career Opportunities are
shown in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9

Example Career Opportunities comments

General Motors
• “Large company so there is the ability to
move to other positions you may like.”
• “This role provides a lot of great
experiences for future jobs Provides
exposure and opportunities to progress
within the company.”
• “No control over your future by merit.”
• “Not all, but certain bosses will
overshadow you and take your work.
You do all the grunt work, they present
to management and get the next level
promotion. Career opportunities are also
very weak. You can move to a new job
internally but don't expect to get a raise
or promotion.”

Tesla
• “A fast program, so you learn in 2 years
what you will learn in 5 years in a Big 3
Auto maker.”
• “With so many exciting projects at Tesla
it’s easy to have the opportunity to learn
and grow in any job role if you are
dedicated to the company.”
• “Great company, good benefits, lots of
room for advancement.”
• “Huge political game. If you make upper
management look bad your career there
is shot, regardless of job performance.”

In the area of Compensation and Benefits, significant differences were found in both
Likert and parsed-text results. General Motors and Tesla employees both rated compensation
and benefits as positive in open-form text responses. General Motors employees also rated
compensation and benefits as significantly higher on a Likert scale than Tesla employees;
compensation and benefits was the highest-rated category by GM employees. Some comments
related to Compensation and Benefits are shown in Table 4.10.
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Table 4.10

Example Compensation and Benefits comments

General Motors
Tesla
• “Benefits, 401K, and salary here are top
• “Salary is very favorable, 3 to 4 days off
notch.”
a week, free health, medical and dental.”
• “Provide regular vacation and sick time.
• “Lower compensation than Bay area
Understanding if you have a medical or
average.”
personal issue.”
• “You’ll need a side hustle to pay the
• “Great benefits and abundant vacation
bills.”
time.”
• “Salaries are competitive and are often
far above the median and what other
companies pay for the same position. The
benefits are what keeps people, even if
the job is killing them.”

Senior Management was scored significantly differently on Likert results, with Tesla
senior managers rating higher than General Motors managers. Employees of both companies
rated Senior Management poorly on both Likert scale responses and open-form text comments,
such as are shown in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11

Example Senior Management comments

General Motors
Tesla
• “Upper management more concerned
• “The top leaders at the company have
about short term stock price, rather than
unrealistic expectations and it leads to
long term sustainability and employee
long hours, overworked groups, and
retention.”
underserved production lines.”
• “Management cannot get over
• “Management doesn't care about their
themselves. They really do not care about
employees.”
the product as long as they get their
• “Higher up management direction can
way.”
conflict with on the ground priorities.”
• “Executive management putting profits
over people. Layoffs in spite of good
profits just to raise stock price because
company owners (shareholders) unhappy
with flat stock price.”
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Open-form text comments referring to Innovation showed a significant difference
between Tesla and General Motors. Tesla employees provided positive comments about
Innovation, while General Motors employees provided negative comments about Innovation.
Unfortunately, Innovation was not provided on the Glassdoor survey instrument as a Likert scale
question. Some examples of comments relating to Innovation include those shown in Table
4.12.
Table 4.12

Example Innovation comments

General Motors
Tesla
• “A company culture that is always trying
• “Work on best in field technology with
to improve and innovate.”
highly innovative projects.”
• “Still very corporate and old school;
• “It is in a constant innovation to be the
needs to become more collaborative and
best product in the market.”
open to new ideas.”
• “Extremely fast paced environment, no
• “The company is stuck in a rigidity mold.
barriers for your work and contribution.”
BE BOLD is just in theory. Don't speak
up is mainstream.”
• “Antiquated ideas and technologies;
NOT A HIGH TECH COMPANY.”

Job Satisfaction was also not included as a Likert scale question but was referenced
frequently in open-form text comments. Employees of both companies rated Job Satisfaction
positively; however, Tesla employees rated Sob Satisfaction significantly higher than General
Motors employees. Some examples of Job Satisfaction comments are shown in Table 4.13.
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Table 4.13

Example Job Satisfaction comments

General Motors
• “Always a new opportunity, great variety
of challenges.”
• “Great and challenging work, with pride
of accomplishment when it’s done.”
• “Slow, no motivation, not inspiring to
young employees.”
• “They will suck the life out of you and
destroy any innovative creative thinking
you possess.”

Tesla
• “The work is very challenging but it's
great being a part of something like this.
It's always fun to see everything change
(for the better) right before your eyes.”
• “Company Mission to "Accelerate the
world's transition to sustainable energy"
is admirable and inspiring. Work is
challenging and invigorating. People are
among the brightest on the planet and
everyone there is motivated by the same
goal, so they are all very willing to help
each other.”
• “Job is more like [a] hobby because
[everyone is] so passionate.”

Employees of both companies frequently referred to the organization’s Mission, but
General Motors employees referenced Mission in a negative way, while Tesla employees rated
Mission as positive. Example comments for Mission are shown in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14

Example Mission comments

General Motors
Tesla
• “Articulate the company's vision more
• “Mission driven Clear vision of the
clearly. If your employees don’t know
future.”
what it is, you can bet your customer
• “Vision you can believe in, pay is fair,
doesn’t know what it is.”
cool product.”
• “I am not sure what the company's
• “Unique, motivating environment mission is anymore. It used to be making
Fulfilling mission and culture.”
the best automobiles possible. Now the
mission is zero this, zero that, while we
try to profit as much as possible on trucks
and SUVs.”

98

The category receiving the most comments across both organizations was Compensation
and Benefits. Further analysis was done on this category to determine which specific areas of
Compensation and Benefits employees commented on the most. Most comments related to
salary or benefits in general, but some comments also referred to vacation/holidays, insurance, or
complementary food.
General Motors employees most frequently mentioned Compensation and Benefits in a
positive way and Efficiency in a negative way. Tesla employees most frequently listed Job
Satisfaction in a positive way and Work/life Balance in a negative way.
Two categories (Career Opportunities, Senior Management) provided results showing
significant differences in Likert scale results but not in parsed open-form text results. These
categories received fewer comments in open-form text responses than other categories showing
significant differences in both Likert scale and parsed-text results, influencing the ability to
determine significance at an α = 0.05 level.
Piecing together a composite picture of each organization as seen through the eyes of its
reviewers, General Motors is seen as having great compensation and benefits, good coworkers,
mixed work/life balance, mixed career opportunities, and poor efficiency, stability, respect, and
senior management. A similar composite of Tesla as assembled from its reviewers portrays a
company with high job satisfaction, mission, innovation, and career opportunities, good
coworkers, mixed compensation and benefits, and poor work/life balance, efficiency, stability,
respect, and senior management.
It is interesting to consider which attributes might be influenced the most by internal
factors. For instance, Tesla’s Mission and (related) Job Satisfaction both scored highly among
its employees. It is likely that Tesla’s high score on Mission is due to the very effective
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transmission of corporate mission by CEO Elon Musk. Work/life Balance, on the other hand,
scored very poorly for Tesla employees, relating directly to internal factors (deadlines and
pressure). Respect and Team/Coworkers, however, are cultural attributes that are more difficult
for an organizational to directly influence. General Motors received universally positive remarks
for Compensation and Benefits, reflecting an intentional prioritization by corporate leaders.
Efficiency is more difficult to directly change (it is doubtful that either company would have
chosen its universally poor rating in Efficiency category). Therefore, as Pasmore and other
discuss sociotechnical systems change [107], it is worth noticing that some parts of the social
systems are more easily adjusted than others.
Also interesting to note are the areas in which General Motors and Tesla align.
Reviewers from both companies rated their satisfaction with coworkers positively and their
managers negatively. Both frequently felt that their companies were inefficient due to “politics,”
bureaucracy,” “pettiness,” “lack of clarity,” and “poor communication.” Both ranked stability
poorly (Tesla and General Motors both conducted layoffs within the overall timeframe of when
the reviews were submitted.)
4.5.2

Limitations
Because Glassdoor.com requires users to complete a review before they can conduct

unlimited company research, it is likely that many of the respondents are currently looking for a
new job, possibly skewing the results toward dissatisfied (or recently laid off) employees. There
is no mechanism in the data to know if the respondent is job hunting; however, the database does
require the respondent to report if they are a current employee of the company or not.
There is also no verification method to ensure that reviewers work, or have ever worked,
for their stated employer.
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4.6

Conclusions
Employee reviews were used to evaluate internal culture with organizations. Culture is

difficult to measure, but the methods within provided a good estimate. Work/life balance and
compensation are the most important factors to engineering employees. Since both of these
factors are largely under the control of management, an organization should be able to improve
its culture by focusing on these factors.
The legacy and startup automotive organizations are very different in terms of culture.
The culture of each is likely related to its external environment as well as its current life-cycle
stage. While this study examined only two firms, it does shine some light on the broader study
of organizational culture and the differences between two related, but very different, firms. This
report will hopefully inspire further similar study of additional organizations which will add
more value to these results by way of increased context.
4.6.1

Future Work
Useful future work would include distributing a custom survey to company employees.

This would allow the research questions to be addressed more directly, without relying on
inferences from a survey prepared independently from the research.
The results of this study could be improved by an increased sample size and through a
broader cross-section of companies.
The open-form text data was parsed and coded by one reviewer; future work could
include having multiple reviewers parse the text and then averaging the results. Additionally,
reviewers could attempt to classify comments according to their relative strength, i.e. strongly
negative, weakly negative, weakly positive, strongly positive.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Three separate studies have been performed using two different data sets to measure
various aspects of organizational variables for General Motors and Tesla. Numerous conclusions
have been drawn based on statistically significant findings from the results. By considering the
results of the studies collectively, additional correlations may be sought. Do the results of these
three studies complement and agree with each other, and what can be learned by considering
each of their results in the context of the other?
5.1

Promotion practices vs. perception of career opportunities
The sample taken from current General Motors engineers who are managers found that

77% were promoted into management at General Motors from non-managerial positions in the
company. Each manager surveyed had been promoted an average of just over 2.5 times. Tesla
engineers who are managers, on the other hand, were promoted from non-managerial internal
positions 63% of the time, with an average of 0.958 promotions. Despite the findings that
General Motors managers were promoted more often, Tesla employees rated career opportunities
significantly higher on a Likert-scale rating. General Motors employees rated “career
opportunities” with a Likert-scale score of 2.97 on a 5-point scale (lower than the overall
company rating of 3.00), while Tesla employees provided an average “career opportunities”
score of 3.63. Based on written comments, General Motors employees mentioned Career
Opportunities positively more often than negatively with a ratio of 0.29 (where -1 is only
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negative and +1 is only positive), while Tesla employees reference career opportunities more and
in a more positive way (ratio: 0.69).Within the parsed text data, many Tesla employees
referenced “learning” and “experience”, which were counted in the Career Opportunities
category for this study, suggesting that they are considering the value of having Tesla on their
resume when seeking jobs outside of the company, so they are not strictly commenting on career
opportunities within their own company.
5.2

What leads to high job satisfaction
Both Tesla and General Motors received more positive than negative comments relating

to job satisfaction, although the ratio of positive to negative for Tesla was more positive then
General Motors’ (0.94 and 0.17, respectively). Is it possible to correlate job satisfaction with
other measured variables? Tesla also received very high ratings for Mission, but General Motors
did not. General Motors received very high ratings for Compensation and Benefits, but Tesla did
not. The only other categories in which both companies were commented positively were Career
Opportunities and Teams/Coworkers. Is it possible that one of these two categories is key to
keeping employees happy? It is more likely that employee job satisfaction is an individual
characteristic, and that employees self-sort into organizations which meet their individual needs
for job fulfillment. Engineers who are attracted to working at Tesla, for instance, probably have
a good idea of the time expectations before they apply; they might be attracted by the challenge,
the mission, or the value of experience to be gained.
5.3

Relationship between workforce background and innovation
It has been proposed in previous works (referenced in Section 1.1.3, among others) that

organizations learn, or develop new ideas, competencies, and advantages, by the absorption of
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employees with external experience complementary to what already exists in the organization. If
traditional theories of learning are true, then a workforce with a broad range of external
experience might be expected to make an organization more innovative. We have seen that our
sample from Tesla had collective experience in far more organizations than the sample from
General Motors. Does that lead to innovation? 18% of employee reviews for Tesla mentioned
innovation or a related keyword in a positive way, while only 5% of reviews for General Motors
said the same (8% of General Motors responses specifically mentioned lack of innovation.)
Employee perception, however, does not implicitly equal reality, so without a solid measure for
innovation itself (something which this study does not attempt to do) it is impossible to prove the
question one way or the other. Even with such a measure, a broader section of companies would
be required to draw significant conclusions without influence from confounding variables. It can
be said, however, that this study does nothing to refute the idea that organizational learning
through diverse workforce background can lead to greater innovation and performance.
5.4

Measuring culture
In order to measure and quantify indicators of organizational culture, data was taken from

the website Glassdoor.com. Glassdoor provides employees (both current and former) a forum to
anonymously provide feedback on employer culture. Online company review sites have been
shown to be an effective data source for estimating certain variables of employer culture [13],
[125], [179], [181]. Culture is difficult to define; however, the methods used in this study
provided measurable and consistent results across a range of employee-reported categories. In
particular, the categorization system developed for parsing open-form comment responses into
cultural attributes provided a satisfyingly consistent way for developing quantitative data from
text data.
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5.5

Relationship to existing literature
While a significant body of work has been published on the automotive industry and its

cultural and organizational variables, relatively fewer works have addressed the rise of a second
U.S. automotive agglomeration or examined its significant culturalp differences. The findings of
this study are consistent with other studies relating to cultural differences of organizations based
on life cycle stage or influences from external environment. This study focuses on employee
experience and perspectives in order to capture information about how various internal and
external variables influence organizational culture and specific attributes thereof. The theories of
external environment, social system, and industry agglomeration which formed the hypotheses
have continued to be reinforced, while novel interactions between have been demonstrated.
5.6

Future extensions of the work
The results from this study have illustrated the need for additional similar studies in (or

across) other industries. Boeing vs. Airbus, NASA vs. SpaceX, Amazon vs. Walmart, or other
studies involving non-U.S. entities such as Toyota, Tata, Hyundai, or BP could add to these
results, increasing their value by adding additional context. It the author’s hope that the results
presented herein will provide a contribution to the understanding of organizational system
performance and inspire additional works in this field.
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